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“Power-sharing can stop wars, but it cannot build strong states if it becomes a permanent substitute for accountable institutions and shared citizenship.” -Ali Halane
Power-sharing arrangements are often introduced as safeguards against conflict. They promise inclusion, balance, and protection from renewed authoritarianism. In both Iraq and Somalia, such systems were adopted under extraordinary circumstances—one after foreign-led regime change, the other following total state collapse.
Yet in both cases, what began as a stabilizing mechanism has hardened into a political structure that perpetuates fragility rather than resolves it.
Iraq’s post-2003 order was built on a sectarian and ethnic power-sharing formula designed to ensure representation for Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. Somalia, emerging from decades of civil war, institutionalized the 4.5 clan-based model to distribute parliamentary seats and executive power among major clans and minority groups.
Both systems were conceived as temporary bridges toward more stable democratic governance. Instead, they evolved into entrenched frameworks that define political competition through identity rather than policy.
At the core of both systems lies the formalization of communal entitlement. Political office is not simply contested; it is allocated. In Iraq, key leadership positions follow an unwritten but widely accepted sectarian distribution. In Somalia, the 4.5 formula remains the primary basis for political representation despite repeated promises of reform.
In neither case has identity-based allocation faded with time. Rather, it has become institutionalized, shaping electoral behavior, coalition formation, and governance outcomes.
This structure produces governments that are broad in composition but narrow in cohesion. Iraq’s successive national unity governments often emerge only after prolonged negotiations, reflecting elite bargains rather than clear electoral mandates.
Somalia’s federal administrations depend on delicate alignments with regional leaders and clan elites, where political survival frequently hinges on managing rivalries rather than advancing coherent policy agendas. The result in both countries is a state that functions, but without strategic direction or deep public trust.
Federalism has compounded the complexity. In Iraq, tensions between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government over oil revenues and constitutional competencies have become recurring flashpoints.
In Somalia, disputes between the federal government and member states regularly escalate over elections, security coordination, and resource control. Federalism was meant to distribute power and reduce concentration; instead, it often serves as an additional arena for political contestation.
Executive authority, meanwhile, tends to become personalized. In Iraq, the prime minister’s office holds significant constitutional powers, making it the focal point of intense political competition.
In Somalia, the presidency is central to executive control and security policy, concentrating influence in ways that heighten political stakes. When power-sharing systems revolve around key offices with expansive authority, competition intensifies and consensus weakens.
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Beyond institutional design, both countries exhibit a political economy shaped by patronage. Ministries frequently operate under quota logic, where political blocs or clans treat portfolios as spheres of influence. Public employment expands, meritocratic standards erode, and corruption becomes embedded in governance practices.
Over time, networks of mutual dependence among political elites solidify resistance to reform. Changing the system would mean dismantling the very mechanisms that sustain elite power.
Public discontent has periodically challenged this arrangement. Iraq’s protest movements have demanded accountability and an end to corruption. Somalia’s leaders have repeatedly pledged transitions toward universal suffrage and a more inclusive democratic framework. Yet structural transformation remains elusive.
The obstacle is not the absence of reform discourse, but the persistence of a political equilibrium that benefits those who control it.
Important differences remain between the two contexts. Iraq retains comparatively stronger institutional foundations and clearer state authority. Somalia continues to rebuild core institutions while confronting persistent security threats.
Iraq’s divisions are primarily sectarian and ethnic; Somalia’s are clan-based within a more culturally homogeneous society. Still, these differences do not alter the central similarity: both systems anchor political legitimacy in group identity rather than shared citizenship.
Power-sharing in deeply divided societies is not inherently flawed. In certain contexts, it has prevented renewed violence and enabled transitional stability. The difficulty arises when such arrangements become permanent substitutes for institutional development and national integration.
When identity becomes the organizing principle of governance, incentives for cross-cutting political movements diminish, and collective national projects struggle to take root.
Moving beyond this pattern requires more than electoral cycles or leadership changes. It demands institutional redesign that reduces the dominance of quota logic, strengthens collective executive decision-making, and encourages political competition organized around national programs rather than communal alignment. It also requires building independent judicial and oversight institutions capable of constraining executive overreach and curbing patronage.
Iraq and Somalia are not trapped by culture or history alone. They are constrained by systems that manage division without transforming it. The challenge before both Baghdad and Mogadishu is not simply how to conduct the next election, but how to recalibrate governance toward citizenship, accountability, and institutional resilience.
Whether power-sharing remains a permanent structure of fragility—or evolves into a stepping stone toward more sustainable democracy—will depend on the willingness of political elites to reform the very arrangements that brought them to power.
Ali Halane is a Somali journalist and researcher specializing in African and Middle Eastern affairs. He is a founding member of the Somali Cultural Parliament.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Dawan Africa.