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“The real danger lies not in Israeli recognition alone, but in its potential evolution into a political and security project that entrenches secession and alters regional balances.”
—— Al-Shafie Abtidon
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland was neither an incidental development nor simply an unexpected move on the regional political chessboard. Rather, it marked a shift by Israel from maneuvering on the margins to embracing a political step that could threaten the Somali state and its territorial integrity.
The move reflects broader security and strategic objectives through which Israel seeks to use Somaliland as a potential strategic security “foothold“ in one of the world’s most sensitive regions.
The significance of this development stems largely from Somaliland’s geographical position along the Gulf of Aden, opposite Yemen and close to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, where the security and commercial interests of regional states and global powers intersect.
From this perspective, Israel’s move can be viewed in the context of its growing cross-border security concerns, particularly the threat posed by Yemen’s Ansar Allah, or Houthi movement, following attacks targeting shipping linked to Israel and disrupting maritime traffic and the activities of Israeli ports.
The implications of recognition, however, do not stop at relations between Israel and Somaliland. They extend to the wider geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, where the move could reshuffle existing calculations.
The issue would become even more consequential if relations were to develop into security or military cooperation, including the establishment of Israeli security facilities, whether openly or covertly, in or around the strategic port of Berbera.
Berbera is not merely a local port. It lies within a geographical corridor directly connected to the Gulf of Aden, Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea—areas closely tied to the national security interests of the Gulf Arab states and countries across the Horn of Africa.
Any long-term Israeli security presence there would therefore have implications extending well beyond Somali territory and could become part of a broader equation involving maritime security and regional and international competition.
Israel’s approach toward Somaliland also raises a broader question concerning state sovereignty, territorial integrity and the principles underpinning the international system.
While Somalia continues to defend its territorial integrity through established international legal and diplomatic frameworks, Israeli recognition exposes a different political reality in which power, interests and alliances increasingly influence relations among states.
For Somalia, perhaps the most consequential message is that legal sovereignty, despite its importance, may not by itself be sufficient to protect the territorial integrity of states when their territories intersect with the interests of regional and international powers.
States weakened institutionally and militarily become more vulnerable to external pressure and attempts to impose new political realities, even when they possess strong legal backing internationally.
Israeli recognition should therefore not be viewed merely as a diplomatic dispute between Mogadishu and Tel Aviv. It should also be understood as a test of the Somali state’s ability to translate international recognition of its sovereignty and territorial integrity into sufficient political and diplomatic leverage to prevent a new reality from becoming entrenched on the ground.
At the same time, Israeli recognition does not necessarily mean that Somaliland has automatically moved closer to achieving the broad international recognition it has pursued for decades.
Instead, it could find itself confronting an even more complicated equation, particularly if Israeli recognition becomes linked to security and strategic arrangements that generate concern among other regional actors.
These developments have also brought renewed attention to the sensitivity surrounding relations with Israel within local society and across a region where the Palestinian issue retains considerable political and popular resonance.
Closer alignment with Israel could therefore generate domestic political and social divisions rather than translate solely into a diplomatic gain.
Relying on Israel as a gateway to broader international recognition also carries clear political risks. After decades of promises and expectations surrounding international recognition, that objective remains far from being achieved on a wide scale.
Meanwhile, close alignment with an Israeli government pursuing a broader regional security agenda could impose political and security costs on Hargeisa that outweigh the anticipated benefits.
This is where the paradox emerges: recognition presented as a political victory could become a source of new pressure if Somaliland is drawn into the conflicts surrounding the Red Sea, Yemen and competition over strategic maritime corridors.
The greatest danger for Mogadishu does not lie in Israeli recognition alone, but in the trajectory that could emerge from it. If recognition remains an isolated diplomatic step, its impact may remain relatively limited.
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But if it develops into an integrated political, economic and security project designed to support and consolidate Somaliland’s secession, Somalia could face an entirely different strategic challenge.
If Israel succeeds in advancing Somaliland’s consolidation as an independent entity, the secessionist movement in Hargeisa could receive an unprecedented political and diplomatic boost.
It could also encourage other actors to reconsider their positions or gradually begin treating Somaliland as a state in its own right, potentially weakening Mogadishu’s position in defending Somalia’s unity and sovereignty.
The danger of such a scenario lies in the possibility that recognition could become a precedent that others might follow, transforming the issue from an internal Somali dispute into a regional and international question in which the interests of major powers and neighboring states increasingly intersect.
Mogadishu would then be confronting not only the challenge of maintaining its territorial integrity but also a new geopolitical reality capable of reshaping spheres of influence and alliances across the Horn of Africa.
The implications of these developments cannot be confined within Somalia’s borders. The Horn of Africa is already burdened by security conflicts and intense regional and international competition, while the Red Sea has increasingly become an arena where military, economic and strategic interests intersect.
Transforming Somaliland into a strategic Israeli ally could give Israel a more firmly established foothold on the Gulf of Aden, adding a new security dimension to an issue historically discussed primarily as a political dispute over unity and secession.
If cooperation were to develop into a long-term security, intelligence or military presence, its consequences could extend to Yemen, Bab el-Mandeb, the Red Sea, the Gulf states and the wider Horn of Africa. The Somali issue would consequently become part of a network of conflicts and alliances far larger than local actors alone could control.
The future of such arrangements could also be influenced by political developments inside Israel and the nature of the government leading the country in the coming period. A continuation of Israel’s approach of expanding the geographical scope of regional security confrontations could push the Horn of Africa and Red Sea toward deeper polarization, particularly if strategic locations on the African side of the waterways become instruments within broader regional conflicts.
Ultimately, Somalia is entering a sensitive period in its modern history. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland cannot be treated merely as a diplomatic development with limited consequences.
Rather, it represents a challenge touching the very concept of the Somali state and its territorial integrity, particularly if recognition evolves from a political gesture into a comprehensive project supporting secession politically, economically and in the security sphere.
The real danger, therefore, is not recognition alone but what could follow it. If a network of regional and international interests and alliances emerges in support of secession, defending Somalia’s unity will become considerably more complicated, and traditional legal and diplomatic tools may no longer be sufficient to confront a new reality gradually taking shape on the ground.
The coming period therefore requires Mogadishu to treat the issue as a matter of national security and state unity, rather than merely a diplomatic disagreement with Israel or a political dispute with Hargeisa.
This requires a coherent political and diplomatic response, alongside efforts to address the internal weaknesses and divisions that create opportunities for external powers to intervene in Somalia’s sovereign affairs.
At its core, the battle is not simply about one country recognizing Somaliland. It is about the future of the Somali state itself: its borders, its sovereignty, its ability to preserve its unity, and its place within the emerging balance of power across the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.
The question that remains for the coming period is whether Israeli recognition will remain an isolated step with limited consequences, or whether it will mark the beginning of a political and security trajectory capable of reshaping the geopolitical map of Somalia and the wider region.
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Al-Shafie Abtidon is a Somali journalist and researcher with a master’s degree in media studies. His research has been published by Arab and international media outlets.
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The opinions expressed in this article are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of Dawan Africa.