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Kenya, November 09, 2026 - Kenya has gone to the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference in Doha with a simple but demanding idea. Digital progress should not be measured by towers built, policies signed or coverage maps published. It should be measured by whether people can actually get online, afford a device and rely on the service when they need it.
Kenya has endorsed the Doha Ministerial Declaration and set out four propositions for the ITU’s Strategic Plan for 2028 to 2031. The propositions cover reliable connectivity, regional resilience of submarine cables and cross-border routes, African capacity in artificial intelligence, and implementation of commitments already agreed under WSIS+20 and the Global Digital Compact.
At first glance, these look like four separate issues. They are not. They form one chain.
A person needs an affordable device. That device needs a reliable network. The network depends on local infrastructure and international cables. Those cables must be protected across borders. And the digital services people use increasingly depend on artificial intelligence systems that understand their language, needs and realities.
If any part of that chain fails, digital inclusion fails with it.
Kenya’s first proposition is the most direct. It says connectivity should be measured by the service people can rely on. That means looking beyond coverage. A mobile signal on a map does not help a student who cannot afford data, a farmer whose network fails during a transaction or a small business owner whose connection drops when it matters most.
Kenya wants the ITU to focus on the last mile, device affordability and network upkeep. These are the unglamorous parts of digital transformation. They rarely appear in launch events. But they decide whether digital services work in daily life.
This is an important shift. For years, digital progress has often been measured by infrastructure: fibre kilometres laid, mobile sites built, spectrum allocated or coverage percentages reported. Those numbers matter. But they are inputs, not outcomes.
The outcome is a person being able to use a service reliably and affordably. Kenya’s argument is that the ITU should measure that outcome.
The second proposition concerns submarine cables and cross-border routes. Kenya wants their resilience planned regionally, with support through the Connected Africa Secretariat, which it chairs.
This may sound technical. It is not.
Submarine cables carry much of Africa’s international internet traffic. When one is damaged, the effects can spread across several countries. Banking systems slow down. Businesses lose access to markets. Governments struggle to deliver online services. People lose access to information and communication.
Africa’s digital infrastructure is often planned within national borders. But cables, fibre routes and traffic do not respect borders. A weakness in one country can expose several others.
Kenya’s point is that African countries need shared planning. They need redundancy, coordinated investment and faster ways to resolve cross-border barriers. The Connected Africa Secretariat is meant to support that cooperation.
But the question is whether it has real power. A secretariat needs more than a name. It needs a workplan, funding, technical capacity and authority to bring governments, regulators and operators together. Without those, it risks becoming another institution that meets, issues statements and waits for the next crisis.
The third proposition is about artificial intelligence. Kenya wants African AI capacity planned at continental scale, and AI systems that serve people in their own languages.
This is perhaps the most ambitious part of Kenya’s agenda.
Most advanced AI models, datasets, computing power and technical standards are concentrated outside Africa. African countries often consume these technologies rather than shape them. That creates a risk that African priorities, languages and local knowledge remain secondary in systems that will influence education, health, farming, security and public administration.
Language is central. If AI tools work mainly in English, French or Arabic, millions of Africans may be excluded. Farmers, traders, teachers, health workers and local administrators need systems that understand Kiswahili, Somali, Luo, Kikuyu, Amharic, Hausa, Zulu and many other languages.
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Kenya’s proposal suggests that African countries should build this capacity together. That could mean shared datasets, African-language models, regional computing infrastructure and common safety standards.
But this requires money, data governance and political coordination. No single African country can build a credible continental AI ecosystem alone. Kenya’s challenge is to turn a strong idea into a funded, practical programme.
The fourth proposition is the least dramatic but possibly the most important. Kenya wants the ITU to help Member States implement what has already been agreed under WSIS+20 and the Global Digital Compact.
The world does not lack digital commitments. It lacks delivery.
Governments have agreed on universal connectivity, digital inclusion, online safety, data governance and cooperation. The difficult questions are who pays, who builds, who regulates and who is left behind.
Kenya’s message is that the ITU should not simply produce more declarations. It should help countries turn existing commitments into services, institutions and measurable results.
This is where Kenya’s own role becomes important. The country is not only making a case in Doha. It is also preparing to host the Internet Governance Forum in Nairobi from December 14 to 18.
That gives Kenya a chance to show whether its international language can become practical action. It can use the forum to bring together governments, technology companies, civil society, researchers and technical communities around a concrete agenda.
Kenya also chairs the Connected Africa Secretariat. That gives it a platform to push for regional cooperation on cables, cross-border infrastructure and digital integration.
But influence at PP-26 will depend on more than speeches. The ITU’s strategic and financial plans for 2028 to 2031 are being negotiated through resolutions, committees and budget decisions. Kenya’s proposals must survive those negotiations.
They must also survive a harder test: whether African countries can agree on shared priorities, financing and implementation.
The deeper issue is that Africa often remains a consumer of global digital rules rather than a shaper of them. Infrastructure is built with external financing. Technology standards are set elsewhere. AI systems are developed outside the continent. Data flows across borders under rules African governments did not always help design.
Kenya’s agenda challenges that pattern. It argues that Africa should not only receive digital services. It should help define the standards, build the infrastructure and shape the technologies that affect its people.
That is why the four propositions matter. They are not simply about faster internet or smarter machines. They are about who controls the digital future and who benefits from it.
The immediate test will come in Doha. Kenya’s proposals must gain support in committee negotiations, survive amendments and secure a place in the ITU’s final strategic and financial plan.
The next test will come in Nairobi. If Kenya uses the Internet Governance Forum to publish a Connected Africa workplan, AI-capacity framework or connectivity indicators, its Doha agenda will have moved beyond rhetoric.
Until then, Kenya’s position remains a strong starting point. The question is whether it can become a plan that African citizens can feel in the quality, cost and reliability of their digital lives.