By Dawan Africa - -
The international security structure that has protected Somalia’s federal government and helped contain Al-Shabaab for nearly two decades is approaching a decisive transition, according to an analysis by the International Crisis Group.
In its recent commentary, The organisation argues that Mogadishu and its partners must begin designing a replacement now, because the United Nations system sustaining African Union forces is likely to close after a final wind-down period.
For readers outside Somalia, the distinction between the two main missions is essential. The African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia, known as AUSSOM, deploys troops and police.
The United Nations Support Office in Somalia, or UNSOS, is not a combat mission; it supplies the food, water, fuel, transport, aviation, medical evacuation and other services that allow AUSSOM to operate from nearly 50 bases across southern and central Somalia.
That model is now nearing its end. In July, the United States informed the African Union that it would not support UNSOS beyond December 2026.
Washington later softened its position, signalling support for a further 12 months in which the UN office would draw down before liquidation. Crisis Group says this concession creates breathing room for a more orderly transition, but does not alter the direction of travel: the security umbrella built since the first African Union deployment in 2007 is on borrowed time.
The warning comes as AUSSOM is already under financial and operational pressure. Its troop strength has fallen from about 22,000 in the mid-2010s to roughly 12,000.
Longstanding donors have reduced support, and the mission has increasingly shifted from major offensives to defending urban centres and assisting Somali-led campaigns. UNSOS, with an annual budget close to $500 million, provides a logistical capacity that neither the African Union nor Somalia can quickly reproduce.
Crisis Group finds serious weaknesses in every alternative. Somalia, the African Union and troop-contributing countries have favoured another 18 to 24 months of international support, but Washington has ruled out UN backing beyond the proposed final year.
An African Union logistics mission would demand expertise the organisation does not yet possess, while hiring a private company could take up to two years and still require substantial funding.
A smaller AUSSOM could concentrate on Mogadishu, regional capitals and other strategic sites. Yet Crisis Group cautions that reducing an already stretched force might leave it unable to protect either its positions or nearby communities.
Recasting it as a regional force under an African Union mandate would keep some troops in Somalia, but would not resolve the central questions of who supplies them, who commands them and who pays.
The report nevertheless rejects predictions of an automatic state collapse or an immediate Al-Shabaab victory. The al-Qaeda-linked group remains entrenched across large rural areas of southern and central Somalia, but the federal government controls most cities, and security in Mogadishu has improved markedly.
Crisis Group’s central concern is a badly managed transition that gradually weakens government control over vulnerable towns, roads and economic corridors, rather than a single dramatic collapse.
Somalia’s own forces are stronger than they were several years ago. Foreign-backed programmes involving Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates and Eritrea have trained more than 10,000 additional troops, while Somali units increasingly lead operations.
Mogadishu said in August that it had about 14,000 soldiers available for combat who could instead be used to hold positions vacated by African Union forces.
But Crisis Group says personnel figures alone can be misleading. Somali troops often have less equipment and training than African Union contingents and still depend on foreign intelligence, air power, transport and logistics. Some locations transferred to Somali forces have later been retaken by Al-Shabaab.
Even Somali-led operations in Lower Shabelle during 2025 and 2026 required significant external support. Replacing every departing African Union soldier with one Somali soldier would therefore carry considerable risk.
The most likely short-term replacement, according to Crisis Group, is a network of bilateral partnerships. Uganda reportedly maintains about 2,000 troops around Mogadishu, while Kenya and Ethiopia retain larger forces near their respective borders.
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Türkiye trains Somali personnel and has deployed drones and fighter aircraft, while the United States says it intends to continue bilateral counter-terrorism operations, particularly through air power.
These forces could prevent a major security breakdown, but they do not share identical priorities. Kenya and Ethiopia focus heavily on protecting their borders; Uganda has a long-term interest in the capital; Türkiye wants to protect extensive strategic investments; and Washington prioritises counter-terrorism.
Without a common framework, Crisis Group warns, bilateral deployments could divide Somalia into separate zones of influence, reinforce tensions between Mogadishu and federal member states, and leave gaps for Al-Shabaab to exploit.
The report identifies parts of Lower Shabelle, where Uganda operates more than a dozen bases, as difficult to sustain without UN logistics. Smaller towns surrounded by Al-Shabaab-held countryside, including Qoryoley, could become exposed.
In Hirshabelle, militants could threaten towns and supply routes along the main road, including Jalalaqsi. Even limited losses would give Al-Shabaab momentum and greater access to taxable roads and commercial centres.
The transition is also inseparable from Somalia’s domestic political divisions. Disputes between the federal government and the leaders of Puntland and Jubaland have obstructed the creation of an integrated national security system. During political crises, federal and state forces have at times confronted one another.
Crisis Group argues that no combination of additional training, foreign aircraft or donor money can produce lasting security if Somali authorities remain divided over power, resources, command and elections.
Its principal recommendation is for Mogadishu to convene a regular forum bringing together the federal government, federal member states, African troop contributors, bilateral partners and donors.
That body should agree on which forces will protect each major city, road and installation; who will provide transport, aviation and medical evacuation; how units will be financed; and where Somali troops must deploy before foreign contingents withdraw.
Financing will require a broader bargain. The African Union would need to raise more resources, while the European Union and United Kingdom could redirect assistance toward regional and Somali forces.
Gulf countries may also prefer bilateral support. Crisis Group adds that Somalia, whose domestic revenue has risen, must shoulder a larger share of the cost.
The report urges the government to use the extension as preparation time, not as a reason to assume the old system will survive. It should avoid launching major new offensives until replacement arrangements are stable, prepare Somali units to occupy positions likely to be vacated, and produce a national transition plan that includes the federal member states.
Resolving the dispute over elections is also presented as vital to creating a government with sufficient authority to lead the process.
Crisis Group concludes that bilateral support can only be a bridge toward a Somali state capable of managing its own security. Some short-term Al-Shabaab gains may be unavoidable as the multilateral system contracts, but careful planning could contain the damage, protect major population centres and transport routes, and give Somali institutions time to become more self-reliant. The decisive danger is delay: by the second half of 2027, a replacement system may need to be operating even as UNSOS concentrates on closing down.
Source: International Crisis Group, “Somalia Awaits a New Security Order as Mission Drawdown Looms”, published September 18, 2026.