By Osman Salah Mohamud - Somali economist with a bachelor’s degree in Economics and Finance and postgraduate studies in Economics and Business Analytics.
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“Somalia cannot keep rebuilding after every disaster while failing to protect the livelihoods that sustain its people and national economy.” Osman Salah Mohamud
Every few years, Somalia lives through the same story. The rains fail for one season, then another. Wells dry up, pasture disappears and animals begin to die. Families walk to towns in search of water and food. Aid agencies appeal for money, trucks arrive and lives are saved. Then, often before families have recovered, heavy rains return and rivers burst their banks.
We have become very good at responding to this cycle. We have not become good at breaking it.
The human cost of the last drought was severe. In March 2023, Somalia’s Federal Ministry of Health, together with the World Health Organization (WHO) and UNICEF, released a study estimating that around 43,000 excess deaths may have occurred in 2022 because of the drought.
Half of them were children under five. The same agencies noted that the toll would have been higher without the rapid scale-up of humanitarian assistance.
Months later came the opposite shock. The 2023 Deyr floods, intensified by El Niño, affected about 2.48 million people and displaced more than 1.2 million, according to a rapid assessment led by the Somali Disaster Management Agency (SoDMA), alongside the UN, World Bank and European Union.
These are not rare accidents. They are recurring economic risks. As long as Somalia treats them as emergencies to be addressed only when they occur, they will continue erasing years of hard-won progress.
For most Somali families, wealth does not sit in a bank. It walks. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), livestock supports 60 to 65 per cent of Somalia’s population and accounts for about 80 per cent of national exports. A herd represents a family’s savings, income, insurance and often its children’s school fees.
When drought kills those animals, the loss lasts far longer than one bad season. A family that loses half its goats or camels may need years to rebuild. Some never recover and end up in displacement camps on the outskirts of Baidoa, Mogadishu or Galkayo.
The national figures are equally stark. Following the 2016–2017 drought, the federal government, working with the World Bank, EU and UN, estimated damages of US$1.02 billion and losses of US$2.23 billion, exceeding US$3.25 billion in total.
The 2023 floods caused a further US$193.4 million in damages and losses, with recovery needs estimated at US$250.2 million. Farms, water systems and roads were among the hardest hit.
The damage also spreads from the countryside to urban centres. When herds collapse and harvests fail, food prices rise in local markets. Traders lose customers, transport companies lose business, and displaced families crowd into cities already struggling with inadequate water, sanitation and employment opportunities.
Children drop out of school. Each of these consequences quietly reduces the economy’s productive capacity for years to come.
The outlook is troubling. The World Bank’s Country Climate and Development Report for Somalia, launched with the government in March 2026, warns that climate change could reduce Somalia’s GDP by up to 13.5 per cent by 2060.
Such projections carry uncertainty, and climate change is not the only cause of Somalia’s crises. Rainfall has always varied, while conflict, weak infrastructure and poor land management compound the impact of climate shocks. Nevertheless, the risks are sufficiently clear to make preparedness a matter of sound economic planning.
Emergency aid is not the problem. When children are malnourished and wells run dry, assistance must arrive quickly. Humanitarian interventions have saved countless lives.
The problem is timing. Relief arrives after the damage has occurred. It feeds families whose herds have already died, but it does not keep those herds alive.
Relief funding is also uncertain. Somalia’s 2023 Humanitarian Response Plan sought US$2.6 billion. According to the UN’s humanitarian office, it received approximately US$1.23 billion, or 47 per cent of the requested amount.
A country that depends on the generosity of distant donors during its worst years has limited control over its future. Every dollar spent rebuilding what has been lost is also a dollar unavailable for schools, clinics or roads.
There is growing evidence that early intervention delivers economic benefits.
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During the 2017 drought, the FAO protected breeding animals in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia by providing feed, veterinary care and water before conditions became critical. The agency reported that families gained benefits worth up to US$9 for every dollar spent, once avoided food aid and restocking costs were considered.
In Somalia, treating a goat cost around 40 cents. Replacing it cost approximately US$40.
In 2024, the FAO provided cash assistance to Somali households before a drought reached its peak, using early warnings from its Somalia Water and Land Information Management service (SWALIM).
Compared with similar households that received no assistance, early recipients experienced better food security, accumulated more savings and were less likely to be displaced. Lump-sum payments also proved more effective in preventing livestock losses than monthly instalments.
At the national level, the World Bank’s climate report finds that cost-effective investments in climate-smart agriculture, resilient cities, disaster-risk management and stronger institutions could halve Somalia’s projected climate-related economic losses.
These findings require some caution. Much of the evidence comes from the agencies implementing the programmes. Results achieved in one district or during one drought may not be replicated everywhere.
Resilience projects can also fail: a borehole that nobody repairs, a dam built without consulting downstream farmers, or a water point that attracts too many animals and degrades surrounding pasture.
Prevention does not automatically deliver value for money. It succeeds when investments are properly targeted, maintained and owned by the communities they are intended to protect.
First, climate resilience must become part of the national budget rather than a separate humanitarian category activated only during emergencies. Even a modest, protected budget allocation for drought and flood preparedness would demonstrate that the government regards these threats as economic priorities.
Second, early warning must translate into early action. Somalia already has valuable forecasting capabilities through SWALIM and the Somali Disaster Management Agency.
What is often missing is funding committed in advance and released automatically when agreed warning thresholds are reached. This would allow cash assistance, animal feed and veterinary services to reach vulnerable families before a crisis peaks.
Third, existing productive assets must be protected. Breeding animals, water points, irrigation canals and river embankments form the foundation of recovery. Maintaining infrastructure already in place is often cheaper and more effective than constructing new facilities that deteriorate within a few years.
Fourth, Somali cities must be better prepared for flooding. Rapid urban growth, much of it driven by displacement, is pushing vulnerable communities into low-lying areas with inadequate drainage. Improved drainage systems, urban planning regulations and protected roads could prevent heavy rainfall from becoming a major disaster.
Fifth, communities and businesses must be involved. Pastoralists and farmers understand which water points function reliably and where grazing pressure is increasing. Traders, mobile-money companies and local banks can distribute cash quickly and help finance resilient enterprises, from fodder production to solar-powered irrigation.
Finally, development partners and climate funds should work through Somali institutions wherever possible, supported by transparent spending, clearly defined responsibilities and independent evaluation.
Success should be measured in practical terms: how many households have reliable water during the dry season, how many animals survive a drought, how quickly roads reopen after floods, and whether economic losses from disasters decline over time.
Somalia cannot stop the rains from failing, nor can it prevent every flood. But it can determine whether the next climate shock destroys years of progress or becomes a difficult season that families and businesses can withstand.
Emergency assistance will always be necessary when lives are at risk. The real choice is whether Somalia continues paying the full price of every disaster or begins investing, steadily and sensibly, in the livelihoods that sustain its economy.
About the Author
Osman Salah Mohamud is a Somali economist with a bachelor’s degree in Economics and Finance and postgraduate studies in Economics and Business Analytics.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Dawan Africa.