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“Sovereignty must be accompanied by stronger institutions, impartial justice, transparent governance and the capacity to resolve political differences peacefully.” Mohamed Idle
The closure of the United Nations Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNTMIS) marks a significant turning point for the country. UNTMIS succeeded the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) on 1 November 2024 under Security Council Resolution 2753 and is scheduled to cease operations on 31 October 2026.
The transition raises a question that goes beyond sovereignty: what institutional safeguards, international advocacy and accountability mechanisms might Somalia lose as the mission departs?
For more than a decade, the UN political mission provided Somalia with an important international platform for political dialogue, state-building, constitutional reform, reconciliation and human rights monitoring.
It connected developments inside Somalia with the Security Council and the wider international community, helping to keep the country’s political transition and institutional challenges on the global agenda.
Somalia will retain its embassies abroad and its Permanent Mission to the UN, but a national diplomatic mission and a UN political mission do not perform the same functions.
The departure of UNTMIS may reduce the continuity of independent political reporting, specialised mediation and coordinated international engagement at a time when constitutional disagreements, relations between the Federal Government and Federal Member States, and electoral arrangements remain central to the country’s stability.
The mission supported dialogue between federal and member state authorities and encouraged peaceful approaches to political disputes. It could not compel Somali leaders to reach agreements, but it offered a platform for engagement when relations became strained.
Without it, responsibility for resolving disputes will fall more heavily on Somali institutions and regional partners such as the African Union and IGAD. The critical question is whether these mechanisms can provide impartial, credible and sustained mediation when political interests conflict.
The mission’s mandate also included monitoring, analysing and reporting on human rights violations, supporting the rule of law and strengthening national justice institutions. Somalia and the UN have agreed that Somalia will assume full responsibility for human rights and civilian protection by October 2026, with remaining functions shifting to the wider UN system.
This represents a meaningful step, but these functions matter most where public trust depends on whether allegations of abuse and misuse of public resources are investigated fairly and addressed through credible institutions.
In my view, one of the most serious shortcomings of Somalia’s political transition has been the failure to establish an effective accountability framework for political leaders and other powerful individuals accused of human rights violations, corruption or financial crimes.
This reflects the persistent weakness of accountability mechanisms within the political system. Allegations must not be mistaken for proof of guilt, but credible allegations of serious abuses or misuse of public resources must be investigated transparently and impartially. Where sufficient evidence exists, appropriate legal action must follow, regardless of an individual’s position, influence or status.
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The concern is that individuals facing credible allegations may continue to exercise political influence without effective legal consequences. Where no lawful investigation, prosecution or other accountability process follows, public confidence in justice weakens, and a culture of impunity can become entrenched. The international community must also ensure that accountability is neither applied selectively nor used as a political instrument.
UNSOM and UNTMIS were not courts, prosecutors or universal enforcement authorities. They could monitor, report, advise and support institutional reform, but they could not independently prosecute every politician accused of wrongdoing. Nor does the closure abolish existing international sanctions or legal procedures.
The deeper concern is whether the mission’s departure will leave a gap in monitoring, advocacy and pressure for credible accountability, particularly if domestic institutions remain unable or unwilling to act.
Somalia’s economic recovery also depends on cooperation with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other development partners. Sustaining debt relief gains, public financial management reforms, infrastructure investment and efforts to attract private capital all require predictable governance and institutions capable of implementing agreed policies.
UNTMIS was not the principal manager of these programmes, but its work on political dialogue and state-building contributed to the wider institutional environment in which development partnerships operate.
If political disagreements undermine cooperation between federal and member state institutions, they could complicate resource-sharing, reform implementation and the delivery of development programmes.
The mission’s departure does not automatically end international financing, but Somalia must ensure that the transition does not weaken the coordination and political conditions needed to sustain economic progress.
Ultimately, the issue is not whether Somalia should exercise sovereignty. It should. The issue is whether sovereignty is accompanied by stronger institutions, impartial justice, transparent governance and the capacity to resolve political differences peacefully.
The closure of UNTMIS should therefore be judged not by the departure of international personnel, but by what follows: whether Somalia can maintain effective international advocacy, protect civic and political space, strengthen the rule of law, hold powerful individuals accountable through lawful processes and sustain the reforms necessary for economic development.
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About the Author
Mohamed Idle is a policy analyst and humanitarian affairs specialist who has worked with UN agencies in several African countries and with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in Somalia.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Dawan Africa.