By Abdi Dahir Mohamed Osman - Writer and PhD researcher specialising in Horn of Africa and Red Sea affairs.
"Geography creates opportunity but guarantees nothing; only the state can turn strategic location into lasting economic and political gains for the national interest." Abd Tahir Mohamed Osman
For many years, Somalia was viewed almost entirely through a single lens: as a state trying to overcome its internal crises and rebuild its institutions after decades of collapse and conflict. Although that image still reflects part of the reality, it is no longer enough to explain Somalia's position today.
Since 2017, developments in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea have changed the nature of the questions facing Somali decision-makers. The issue is no longer limited to achieving domestic stability. It now includes protecting national interests in a region where political, military and economic balances are being reshaped at a rapid pace.
The reality is that Somalia has found itself, perhaps for the first time in many years, at the centre of a regional equation far larger than itself. A country once portrayed mainly as a recipient of external influence has become part of the calculations of regional and international powers seeking to expand their influence in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa.
This shift requires Somalia to rethink the meaning of its national interest. What does the state want to achieve? What are its priorities? How can it benefit from its strategic position without becoming an open arena for competition among other powers?
In my view, Somalia's national interest cannot be understood apart from geography. Some states derive their influence from their economies, while others build it through military power. Somalia, however, begins with an asset that cannot be ignored: its location.
That location has not changed for centuries, but its value shifts with international circumstances. Today, as competition over maritime corridors and global trade routes intensifies, Somalia's coastline has become one of the state's most important strategic assets.
For this reason, the sea is no longer merely a geographical extension of Somalia or a potential economic resource. It has become part of the country's national security. Ports, shipping lanes and territorial waters are no longer technical matters to be left to specialists alone. They have become political and sovereign questions directly linked to the state's standing and future.
Anyone following regional debates in recent years will have noticed that the Red Sea is now discussed alongside oil, security and military power. Control of trade routes has become a new form of influence.
This helps explain the major transformation that followed the Gulf crisis of 2017. The crisis did not remain confined to the Gulf. Its consequences extended directly into the Horn of Africa, where the region's ports attracted growing interest.
Regional capitals began to view the Horn of Africa as an important arena for securing their political, economic and military interests. Over time, this presence became a permanent reality rather than a temporary response to a passing political crisis. Each actor developed its own vision for the region's future and its own calculations concerning the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden.
Amid these shifts, Somalia could not ignore what was happening around it. The more important the region became, the more valuable Somalia's location grew. As competition in the Red Sea intensified, so did the strategic value of its coastline.
Major opportunities, however, often carry risks of a similar scale. External interest can bring investment, assistance and valuable partnerships, but it can also create pressure and interference when the country lacks a clear national vision.
This is one of the central paradoxes in Somalia's position. The state needs external partnerships in many fields, yet it must also preserve the independence of its national decision-making. That balance is not easy to maintain.
The fragility of Somalia's domestic political structure has made the effects of external competition more visible. Many regional powers have dealt not only with the federal government but also directly with local actors, blurring the line between domestic and foreign calculations. At times, regional disputes have appeared to find a direct expression within Somali politics.
I do not believe any issue reflects this overlap more clearly than the self-declared republic of Somaliland. For many years, the issue was discussed within a domestic framework centred on unity and secession. In recent years, however, it has acquired new dimensions connected to geography, ports and regional relations.
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The issue is therefore no longer simply an internal political dispute. It has become tied to wider balances involving Red Sea security and the future of competition in the Horn of Africa. Developments in 2024 clearly demonstrated the sensitivity that now surrounds this file.
The question no longer concerns only a local political status. It is now linked to sovereignty, recognition, access to the sea and regional influence, which explains the scale of the reaction it has generated both inside and outside Somalia.
Still, focusing on risks alone produces an incomplete reading of the situation. Somalia now has opportunities that may not have existed only a few years ago. There is international interest in investing in infrastructure, developing maritime capacity, and supporting stability and development.
The presence of multiple actors also gives Somalia more room to manoeuvre than it had in the past. The challenge lies in how that space is managed. History is full of states that possessed strategically important locations but failed to turn them into real power.
History also shows that geography alone does not create influence. The state turns location into power when it knows what it wants from the world, understands how to achieve its goals, and manages its foreign relations in a way that serves its long-term interests.
From this perspective, I see Somalia's national interest as resting on four connected elements. The first is preserving the unity of the state and its political sovereignty. The second is protecting its maritime rights and developing the capabilities required for a blue economy.
The third is managing foreign relations in a balanced way that prevents dependence on any one side. The fourth is converting Somalia's geographical position into genuine negotiating and economic leverage.
The greatest challenge, however, is how to use this importance effectively. The world now recognises the value of Somalia's location. The question is whether the country's political elite possess the vision and capacity needed to convert that value into lasting gains. Geography creates opportunity, but it does not guarantee success.
If the years since 2017 have returned Somalia to the centre of geopolitical calculations in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, what will happen over the next decade? Will Somali decision-makers harness this location to advance development and national sovereignty, or will intensifying competition turn the country into an arena where the interests of others collide?
Can Somalia build a balanced foreign policy that maintains good relations with different partners without falling into the trap of rival blocs and political polarisation?
And what of the sea? Will it become the true gateway to the economic revival Somalia has long awaited, or will it remain a domain in which external powers compete more than the Somali state benefits?
What about the self-declared republic of Somaliland? Will it remain an internal issue open to a political settlement, or will it increasingly become a geopolitical knot tied to the future of the entire Red Sea?
The most important question is whether Somalia now has a clear national project that defines what it wants from its geographical position and its regional and international relations, or whether that project is still taking shape.
These are not theoretical questions. They will determine the shape of Somalia's national interest in the years ahead and, to a great extent, define the country's place in a region where the balance of power and influence is being continually reshaped. The answers may offer a clearer guide to Somalia's future than anything else.
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Abdi Dahir Mohamed Osman is a writer and PhD researcher specialising in Horn of Africa and Red Sea affairs.
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The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Dawan Africa.