Editor’s Note: In this concluding part of the series (Somaliland Recognition Crisis: Lessons from Harrar and Policy Directions) Mohamed Dahir shifts from analysis to policy action, drawing on the Harrar precedent to outline practical options for Somalia, Somaliland, and international partners—framing the Somaliland question as a decisive test for stability and sovereignty in the Horn of Africa”.
Foreign governments should refrain from actions that treat Somaliland as a sovereign entity.
The Somaliland issue should be addressed through African Union and United Nations frameworks, not through individual geopolitical maneuvers.
Major powers can affirm this approach by issuing statements supporting Somalia’s constitutional process to resolve the status of its regions.
Support AU Mediation Efforts
International partners should encourage the African Union to take a more active role in facilitating dialogue.
The United Nations, European Union, Arab League, and other stakeholders should back an AU-led initiative to bring Somalia’s federal government and Somaliland officials to the table.
This may include offering neutral venues, technical expertise, or observers to talks.
The objective would be to explore creative arrangements—such as autonomy guarantees and power-sharing formulas—within Somalia’s constitutional order.
By working through the AU, which holds moral authority on African border issues, external powers can help ensure that any outcome is broadly acceptable in Africa and does not set a dangerous precedent.
Coordinate Reactions to Prevent Spoilers
The Israel–Somaliland episode demonstrated how a single outlier action can disrupt regional stability.
Going forward, major international actors should coordinate closely on the Horn of Africa.
Members of the UN Security Council and influential regional states—including the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, Gulf states, and Turkey—could form an informal contact group on the Somalia–Somaliland issue.
Through quiet diplomacy, they could collectively discourage further recognitions and instead channel efforts toward conflict resolution and development support.
Presenting a unified front would reduce Somaliland’s ability to play one country off another in pursuit of recognition.
Bolster Somalia’s State-Building and Security
A stable, well-governed Somalia represents the most effective long-term response to separatist pressures.
International partners should increase assistance to Somalia’s state-building efforts, including capacity-building for federal institutions, economic investment, and security-sector reform.
Particular attention should be given to integrating local forces from areas such as SSC-Khaatumo.
This support must be accompanied by respect for Somalia’s ownership of its internal affairs.
Strengthening governance and service delivery nationwide will address legitimate frustrations that fuel secessionist sentiment.
It will also reassure local populations that remaining part of Somalia brings tangible benefits, whereas breaking away leads to uncertainty and isolation.
Avoid Military Deals that Bypass Mogadishu
Foreign powers seeking strategic access—such as ports or military facilities in the Red Sea arena—should work through the Somali Federal Government rather than striking side deals with Somaliland.
Any security cooperation in Somaliland’s territory must have Mogadishu’s consent, in accordance with Somalia’s sovereignty.
This principle should be clearly communicated by major donors and military partners.
For example, if international naval forces seek logistical hubs in Berbera or elsewhere, agreements should be negotiated with the FGS.
Such an approach prevents legitimizing Somaliland authorities as equivalent to Somalia’s government and avoids fueling perceptions or realities of proxy competition.
It also aligns with Somalia’s efforts to establish uniform rules for foreign presence across all its regions.
Support Humanitarian Access and Reconciliation
International organizations and donor nations should press for unfettered humanitarian access to conflict-affected areas, including Las Anod.
If Somaliland authorities continue to restrict aid or services as punishment for dissident regions, global donors should speak out and, if necessary, reroute assistance through impartial channels such as local NGOs or UN agencies in coordination with the FGS.
In addition, donors should support reconciliation initiatives, including funding local peace dialogues among clans in Sool and Sanaag and providing expertise in post-conflict reconstruction and trauma healing.
Such carefully delivered external support can help repair divisions exacerbated by Somaliland’s military response.
It signals to Somaliland’s population that the international community prioritizes civilian well-being over political expediency.
6.1.2. For Somaliland’s Leadership (Hargeisa Administration)
Somaliland’s leadership should immediately cease offensive military operations in contested areas such as Las Anod.
Continuing military crackdowns will only deepen Somaliland’s isolation and further erode its legitimacy.
Instead, authorities should commit to a ceasefire and accept neutral monitoring where necessary.
In parallel, Somaliland’s leadership should publicly acknowledge the political nature of conflicts in Sool, Sanaag, and Awdal.
These are Somali communities with genuine grievances, not terrorist entities.
Abandoning the “extremism” narrative would signal readiness for a political solution.
Respected traditional elders and community leaders—including those opposed to Somaliland—should be invited to mediated dialogue on local governance and power-sharing.
The events of Las Anod demonstrated that coercion produces long-term strategic loss rather than compliance.
A good-faith dialogue, potentially facilitated by the Somali federal government or the African Union, remains the only viable path to rebuilding trust.
Recalibrate the Quest for Recognition
A single recognition achieved through secretive bargains has backfired.
Rather than expanding legitimacy, it triggered condemnation from the African Union and neighboring states, leaving Somaliland more isolated.
Somaliland’s leadership should pause and reassess its strategy.
If international recognition remains an objective, it should be pursued through regional legitimacy first—by addressing Somalia’s and Africa’s objections through negotiation rather than end-runs that alarm the region.
Any agreement involving foreign military assets or population relocation on behalf of external powers is guaranteed to provoke regional backlash and internal dissent.
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In practical terms, this means halting covert agreements that trade elements of Somaliland’s sovereignty for short-term diplomatic gains.
The focus should instead be on earning trust by assuring neighbors that Somaliland will not serve as a base for hostile activities and by demonstrating commitment to peace in the Horn of Africa.
Reinforce Internal Legitimacy Through Inclusive Governance
Somaliland’s leadership should treat internal legitimacy as a strategic asset.
This requires strengthening institutional checks on executive power, protecting political opposition, and safeguarding media and civil society freedoms in practice.
Responses to dissent should prioritize political dialogue and mediation over security measures.
Decision-making processes must reflect equitable inclusion across clans and regions, particularly in contested areas.
Without visible civilian consent and protection, external recognition efforts will remain unstable and contested.
Durable legitimacy depends on governance practices, not external validation.
Acknowledge and Address Peripheral Demands
Hargeisa must recognize that large segments of the population in its claimed territory do not consent to Somaliland’s independence.
Ignoring this reality weakens Somaliland’s position.
Engagement with SSC-Khaatumo leadership and Awdal community elders should occur through honest, inclusive dialogue.
This may involve exploring special arrangements such as significant devolution of power or regional autonomy within a reunified Somalia.
Continuing to deny the existence of the North Eastern State is counterproductive.
Any viable settlement of Somaliland’s status must include compromises that grant these communities a meaningful voice.
Whether the outcome lies within federal Somalia or another negotiated framework, it cannot be imposed unilaterally by Hargeisa.
Willingness to consider federative or confederal arrangements could open paths toward peace and broader acceptance.
Prioritize Regional Peace and Cooperation
To improve its standing, Somaliland should seek recognition as a responsible regional actor rather than a source of instability.
This entails cooperation on humanitarian issues, intelligence-sharing on genuine extremist threats, and restraint in rhetoric.
It may also require re-engaging in talks with Mogadishu under existing frameworks with an open mind.
Demonstrating commitment to regional stability can help Somaliland rebuild bridges.
A public pledge to respect the African Union’s final determination on its status could signal humility and willingness to abide by continental decisions.
While such steps may not yield immediate recognition, they would generate goodwill and reduce isolation.
7. Conclusion
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has transformed a long-running diplomatic impasse into an urgent regional challenge.
For Somalia’s federal leadership, the immediate priority is to manage tensions without triggering wider conflict.
Strategically, Somalia must shut down unilateral recognition pathways while strengthening domestic legitimacy through inclusive governance and development.
The Harrar precedent of 1943–44 offers guidance.
Ethiopia rejected an externally imposed autonomy scheme while addressing internal needs through sovereign means.
Somalia should adopt a similar approach—an unequivocal rejection of external end-runs around its authority, paired with constructive internal policies to address grievances.
A sustainable resolution to the Somaliland question ultimately depends on confronting internal realities within Somaliland.
The emergence of SSC-Khaatumo demonstrates that when communities are pushed too far, they seek solutions within Somalia’s federal framework.
Somalia’s government should continue supporting these federative solutions as instruments of stabilization and unity.
For Somaliland’s leaders, long-term interests lie in legitimacy and peace rather than external shortcuts.
Recognition by one or two states cannot resolve internal dissent or overcome regional opposition.
The viable path forward lies in mutual de-escalation, civilian protection, and good-faith negotiations on governance, representation, and resource-sharing within Somalia’s constitutional framework.
Somaliland’s quest for recognition need not end in a lose-lose outcome.
With wisdom and flexibility from all sides, a shared future remains possible—one in which Somaliland’s people enjoy self-governance and dignity while Somalia’s unity is preserved.
The Harrar principle still holds: a sovereign state may reject externally imposed disintegration while pursuing negotiated solutions to internal divisions.
Somalia and Somaliland now face that test.
The choices made in the coming months will determine whether the Horn of Africa enters a new cycle of fragmentation or sets a precedent for conflict resolution grounded in law, dialogue, and national cohesion.
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You can read the part 1, and part 2 of the series in these links
Part 1:
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*Mohamed Daahir is a Diplomacy and International Relations scholar who writes on geopolitics, governance, and strategic communication.
Email: modaahir14@gmail.com
* The opinion expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Dawan Africa.
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Opinion-Somaliland Recognition Crisis: Lessons from Harrar and Policy Directions (2-3)





