Opinion-Somaliland Recognition Crisis: Lessons from Harrar and Policy Directions (2-3)

Editor’s Note: In this part two of the series (Somaliland Recognition Crisis: Lessons from Harrar and Policy Directions) the writer will continue by examining how Somaliland’s leadership has responded to internal dissent and external pressure through competing narratives, security framing, and regional messaging, and how these strategies have influenced regional and international perceptions of the crisis

The SSC-Khaatumo leadership drafted a regional constitution affirming loyalty to Somalia. By July 2025, Somalia’s federal government officially recognized the North Eastern State as a new federal member.

This development gave the disenfranchised communities their own state within Somalia—akin to Puntland, Jubaland, and others—negating the narrative that their only path to self-determination lay through Somaliland’s breakaway.

It demonstrated a peaceful, constitutional outlet for their aspirations, posing a direct challenge to Somaliland’s claim over those territories.

The implications of these developments are profound. Somaliland’s claim to represent a stable, united state is undercut by internal fractures.

Large portions of the territory it claims are now beyond its control, administered by the new federal state and allied local authorities.

Even in areas where Somaliland still holds authority, distrust runs high among non-Isaaq minorities and opposition groups.

The recent conflict also eroded clan trust within Somaliland’s core. President Muse Bihi’s administration, dominated by one Isaaq sub-clan, has jailed opposition figures and delayed elections, prompting criticism that Somaliland’s democracy is backsliding.

In sum, Somaliland’s house is divided. Any durable settlement will require acknowledging that not all its inhabitants consent to independence; many instead demand meaningful inclusion and autonomy within Somalia rather than being forced into a breakaway state.

5. Competing Narratives and Regional Perceptions

In the face of these setbacks, Somaliland’s leadership has often resorted to narrative manipulation to justify its actions and rally international sympathy.

During the Las Anod crisis, Hargeisa consistently framed the conflict as a counter-terrorism operation, labeling local protesters and SSC fighters as “terrorists” linked to Al-Shabaab or portraying them as puppets of Puntland and Mogadishu.

Somaliland officials floated conspiracy theories, at times even suggesting foreign powers such as China were behind the unrest, but offered no evidence.

In reality, as independent observers noted, the Las Anod uprising was rooted in local clan grievances and aspirations for self-rule, not jihadism.

The international community largely saw through this narrative. Somaliland’s heavy-handed military response and human rights abuses spoke louder than its propaganda.

Multiple foreign governments and human rights organizations condemned Somaliland’s excessive use of force and urged it to negotiate rather than brand its own citizens as extremists.

The attempt to cloak a political conflict in the language of the “global war on terror” backfired, damaging Somaliland’s credibility.

On the ground, Somaliland’s tactics further alienated locals and horrified observers.

Beyond artillery shelling of civilian areas, Somaliland authorities imposed blockades and communications blackouts, including shutting down internet and telecom services in Las Anod at the height of protests, effectively besieging the city both physically and digitally.

There were credible reports that Somaliland forces obstructed humanitarian aid, blocking ambulances and medical supplies from reaching the wounded, and even deliberately striking hospitals.

Amnesty International condemned these actions as violations of international humanitarian law.

Such coercive measures—shelling, sieges, and cutting off information and aid—paint a picture of a government attempting to force a region into submission at gunpoint.

Far from quelling resistance, these actions hardened it. Somaliland’s promises of dialogue carried little weight when delivered under military assault, and local leaders remained deeply skeptical of Hargeisa’s intentions.

For Somalia’s federal government and international partners, one takeaway is clear: countering false narratives and maintaining focus on root causes is essential.

The conflicts in eastern Somaliland are fundamentally political and clan-driven, not terrorism-driven—a reality supported by on-the-ground evidence and acknowledged by regional observers.

Recognizing this shifts the policy approach toward reconciliation and inclusive political dialogue.

It underscores that stability lies in addressing legitimate grievances—representation, resource-sharing, and local governance—rather than accepting a misguided “terrorism” pretext for crackdowns.

Somalia and its partners should continue to highlight the truth of these conflicts and ensure that any engagement with the Somaliland issue is grounded in facts rather than propaganda.

Somaliland’s misrepresentation of the Las Anod conflict and its brutal tactics have badly undermined its international goodwill.

Once seen as a peaceful enclave, Somaliland now faces growing questions about its commitment to democracy and human rights.

Domestically, every mortar shell that struck Las Anod deepened clan hatred and distrust toward Hargeisa’s rule.

Breaking this cycle will require Somaliland’s leaders to move away from bullets and propaganda and toward honest acknowledgment of dissenting voices.

The groundwork is laid for a different approach—one that prioritizes ceasefire, dialogue, and compromise.

What follows are detailed policy recommendations designed to turn these insights into action.

6. Policy Recommendations

The following recommendations are action-oriented and tailored to three key stakeholder groups.

They aim to contain the fallout from the shock of Somaliland’s recognition, prevent further escalation, and chart a path toward a peaceful resolution within Somalia’s constitutional framework.