By Ali Halane - Journalist and Political analyst
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland matters not because it immediately changes the territory’s legal status, but because it tests whether the international consensus surrounding Somalia’s territorial integrity remains as solid as many have assumed.
For more than three decades, Somaliland has operated with its own institutions, elections, security structures, and administration. Yet despite its de facto autonomy, no state had formally recognized it as an independent country. That reality has now changed.
The most important question facing Somalia today is therefore not why Israel acted. The more important question is whether Israel will remain alone.
History suggests that major diplomatic shifts rarely happen all at once. They begin with a precedent. One actor breaks the barrier, others observe the reaction, and only then do they decide whether the political cost is acceptable. In international politics, first movers often carry the greatest risk, while those who follow benefit from the path that has already been cleared.
This is why Somalia should not view Israel’s decision as a single diplomatic incident. It should view it as a strategic test.
Will recognition carry a political price? Will Somalia’s allies actively defend its territorial integrity? Will international organizations move beyond statements and take meaningful diplomatic action? Or will the issue gradually fade from the headlines, creating space for others to explore similar relationships?
These questions matter because formal recognition is rarely the first step in a diplomatic process. More often, it is the last.
Political engagement frequently begins through commercial offices, economic partnerships, security cooperation, port agreements, official visits, and informal diplomatic channels.
Over time, these relationships can create a political reality that eventually overtakes the legal one. Recognition often arrives after the facts on the ground have already changed.
Israel’s decision should also be understood through a geopolitical rather than an ideological lens.
The move is not primarily about Somaliland itself. It is about geography.
Located along the Gulf of Aden and near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Somaliland sits beside one of the world’s most important maritime corridors. The region has become increasingly valuable as the wars in Gaza and Sudan, the conflict in Yemen, growing tensions involving Iran, and wider instability across the Red Sea reshape regional security calculations.
In today’s geopolitical environment, ports matter. Shipping routes matter. Strategic positioning matters.
Countries are increasingly pursuing influence through access, infrastructure, and logistics rather than through traditional territorial expansion. In this context, Somaliland’s location gives it significance far beyond its size.
That is why Israel’s move should not be interpreted as an isolated diplomatic gesture. It reflects broader strategic competition taking place across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.
The question is whether others see similar opportunities.
No responsible analyst can confidently identify which country might be next. Diplomatic decisions depend on political calculations that often remain hidden until the last moment.
What can be identified, however, is the category of states that may eventually consider a similar path.
These are countries with significant interests in maritime trade, Red Sea security, port infrastructure, regional influence, or strategic competition with rival powers.
Such states may not grant recognition tomorrow. In fact, many may continue publicly supporting Somalia’s territorial integrity. Yet support for territorial integrity and practical engagement are not always the same thing.
A government can reaffirm Somalia’s unity while opening an economic office in Hargeisa. It can support international law while signing a security agreement with Somaliland authorities.
It can reject formal recognition while treating Somaliland as an increasingly independent partner in trade, migration, logistics, or maritime security.
This is where Somalia faces its greatest challenge.
The danger is not necessarily a wave of immediate recognitions. The danger is the gradual emergence of what might be called practical recognition without formal recognition.
Over time, the distinction between the two can become increasingly blurred.
The implications extend beyond Somalia.
The international system is entering a period of heightened instability. Across several regions, old assumptions are being tested. Wars, internal conflicts, weak governance structures, and shifting power balances are creating new realities faster than traditional diplomacy can respond.
Sudan is facing a devastating conflict with uncertain political outcomes.
Libya remains divided.
Yemen continues to experience competing centers of authority.
Other fragile states face similar pressures.
In such an environment, questions about sovereignty, legitimacy, and territorial control are becoming more complicated.
The Horn of Africa and the Middle East can no longer be viewed as separate geopolitical theaters. Events in one increasingly shape developments in the other.
What happens in Gaza affects Red Sea security.
What happens in Yemen affects maritime trade.
What happens in Sudan influences regional stability.
And what happens in Somalia increasingly affects the strategic calculations of actors far beyond the Horn of Africa.
For Somalia, this means legal arguments alone are unlikely to be sufficient.
International law remains important. Somalia’s territorial integrity is recognized internationally and supported by the African Union, the United Nations, and most governments around the world.
But international politics has never been driven by legal principles alone.
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Power, influence, alliances, and strategic interests also shape outcomes.
The challenge for Somalia is therefore not only to defend its legal position, but to strengthen its political position as well.
This raises an important question about Somalia’s partners.
Who are Somalia’s real friends?
Are they the governments that issue statements supporting Somalia’s unity?
Or are they the governments willing to use diplomatic influence to ensure that Israel’s recognition does not become a wider trend?
The distinction matters.
Public statements have value. Yet the true measure of support is often found in private diplomacy, strategic pressure, and political action.
Somalia should engage all of its partners—including the African Union, the Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, Türkiye, Egypt, Djibouti, Ethiopia, the Gulf states, the United States, and the European Union—with a simple question:
What are you prepared to do to prevent the next recognition?
However, before Somalia asks that question abroad, it must ask a difficult question at home.
Does it project the image of a confident and united state?
Do its political institutions speak with one voice?
Are constitutional and electoral disputes being managed within a stable democratic framework, or are they exposing deeper divisions that outsiders can exploit?
Perhaps most importantly, does Somalia offer the people of Somaliland a compelling vision of what unity would mean in practice?
This is the issue that cannot be avoided.
Israel did not create Somalia’s internal weaknesses.
It took advantage of them.
Any state that considers following the same path will likely make its decision based not on the strength of Somaliland’s legal case, but on its assessment of Somalia’s political strength and cohesion.
That reality points toward three priorities for Somali policymakers.
First, Somalia must strengthen internal unity. No country can effectively defend its sovereignty while remaining deeply divided over fundamental political questions. Internal cohesion remains the first line of defense against external challenges.
Second, Somalia must pursue an active diplomatic strategy rather than a purely reactive one. The goal should not simply be to condemn Israel’s decision. The goal should be to increase the political and diplomatic costs for any future state considering a similar move.
Third, Somalia should open a new political conversation with the people of Somaliland themselves.
This does not require abandoning Somalia’s position on territorial integrity. Nor does it require accepting separatist claims.
It does require recognizing that many Somaliland residents are motivated not by foreign alliances but by concerns about dignity, representation, governance, security, and economic opportunity.
If Somalia cannot offer an attractive vision of unity, others will continue offering alternative visions.
In the end, Israel’s recognition is more than a diplomatic dispute.
It is a strategic warning.
It highlights how quickly geopolitical realities can change. It demonstrates how internal political weaknesses can create external vulnerabilities. And it reminds Somalia that preserving unity requires more than legal legitimacy alone.
The challenge now is not only Israel.
It is the possibility that others may conclude Somalia lacks the capacity to stop them from doing the same.
For that reason, Somalia’s message must be clear: recognizing Somaliland should not be a cost-free decision.
Yet that message will only be credible if it comes from a more unified state, a more responsible political class, and a more compelling national project.
States do not always fall because of external pressure.
Sometimes they weaken because their internal divisions become deeper than their ability to respond.
Ali Halane is a Somali journalist and researcher specializing in African and Middle Eastern affairs. He is a founding member of the Somali Cultural Parliament.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Dawan Africa.