By Abdikadir Muhyadin (Dalha) - senior practitioner in local government and urban development
“A capital cannot effectively serve a federal nation when its constitutional powers remain undefined, fragmented, and subject to political discretion.”- Abdikadir Muhyadin Ahmed (Dalha)
Since Somalia’s independence in 1960, Mogadishu has served as the nation’s constitutional capital and the seat of the Central Government. Throughout different political eras, however, its governance has changed significantly without a clear constitutional clarity regarding its political and administrative status.
Following the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, Mogadishu experienced prolonged conflict, institutional collapse, and fragmentation under rival armed groups. Between 2004 and 2012, the Transitional Federal Governments restored the capital as the seat of the Government and adopted the provisional constitution with the federal system of governance, yet they failed to determine Mogadishu’s constitutional status.
Between 2012 and 2022, discussions continued around three possible governance models: establishing Mogadishu as a municipal district, A Capital city State, or A capital city incorporating it into an existing Federal Member State. Despite extensive debate on these models, no formal constitutional settlement was achieved.
The adoption of the new Constitution in 2026 attempts to address the issue through Article 63, but it also introduces new legal ambiguities and institutional inconsistencies. This article opinion argues that although the Constitution formally recognizes Mogadishu as the federal capital, it fails to provide a coherent governance model, leaving the city with limited autonomy and excessive dependence on the Federal Government. The below deliberation focuses on article 63 and its clauses, shedding light on the ambiguities, gaps and legal/political complications.
Clause 1 of Article 63 provides that the Capital Administration shall consist of a Capital Assembly, an Executive Council, and a Judiciary. While this creates the basic institutional framework, it fails to define the powers, responsibilities, or relationships among these institutions. Although the Electoral Law provides for the election of a Capital Assembly, neither the Constitution nor the electoral law specifies its structure, legislative authority, or constitutional functions. Without such legal clarity, the establishment of these institutions may create administrative confusion and constitutional disputes. The current practical experience is that the Banadir’s elected district councils could not operate due to absence of comprehensive Local Government Law defining their authority and administrative structures as well as their relations with the Capital’s administration.
Clause 2 outlines that the 91 members of the Capital Assembly will be elected from Banadir’s districts based on popular representation. This provision strengthens democratic participation by allowing residents to elect their representatives directly. However, it raises an important question regarding representation among Mogadishu’s diverse communities. Unlike the Federal Member States, where their legislative seats have been allocated through negotiated clan-based power-sharing arrangements, but Mogadishu lacks an agreed formula for distributing the 91 members. Unless this issue is resolved before city elections, it may become a significant source of political disagreement and undermine the legitimacy of the Capital Assembly.
Clause 3 replaces the current office of the Banadir Governor with an elected Mayor by the Capital Assembly. Deputy Mayors will also be elected, while the Mayor will appoint Secretaries to manage executive affairs. However, the Constitution does not specify the number of Deputy Mayors or establish the legal framework governing the appointment, powers, or responsibilities of the Secretaries.
The current administration includes several Deputy Governors and a Secretary General appointed by the President to ensure administrative representation and political balance. To reduce the numbers of the Deputy Mayors, the establishment of the Capital Assembly with Speaker and two deputy Speakers can be a room to resolve issue of representation. It also sets a mechanism on power separation between the legislative and executive branches that on the other hand would improve accountability and transparency.
Clause 4 grants Banadir a representation in the Upper House of Parliament based on the 18 regions of Somalia,Nevertheless, neither the Constitution nor the Electoral Law specifies how many seats Banadir should receivefrom the Upper House. Articles of 77 and 78 of the new constitution maintains that the 54 seats of the Upper House will represent the Federal member states, likewise, the Electoral law, article 14 distributes those 54 seats among the federal member states, while Mogadishu is not recognized as a Federal Member State under thenew Constitution. Consequently, Banadir’s constitutional entitlement to Upper House representation remains uncertain with potential political disputes during future elections.
Clause 5 gives the Federal Government exclusive authority over security and political affairs within the capital. This provision significantly limits the autonomy of the Capital Administration by denying its meaningful authority over local security and political decision-making. Unlike many federal capitals around the world those enjoy local security role to ensure local law enforcement, this clause denies Mogadishu to qualify such role. Similarly, this clause excludes political authority from the Capital Administration and it weakens the Capital’s ability to enact and implement local regulations, taxation policies and urban planning initiatives for better city to live in.
Clause 6 gives the Federal Government the authority to appoint a senior representative responsible for protecting federal interests within the capital. However, the Constitution does not define the powers or explain how the federal’s representative will interact with the future elected Mayor. This creates a potential possibility of overlapping authority and institutional conflict. This provision also reinforces federal control by effectively replacing the historical office of the Banadir Governor with a federally appointed representative whose constitutional role remains undefined.
Clause 7 grants the Capital Administration powers listed in schedule 2(C) in the Constitution while excluding matters relating to security, political affairs, and any additional powers reserved under a federal legislation. Although this clause appears to provide powers comparable to those exercised by Federal Member States, the broad authority granted to the Federal Government to reserve additional powers meaning that the Capital Administration remains vulnerable to future federal interventions and control over local matters.
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Clause 8 requires both Houses of Parliament to enact future legislation regulating the relationship between the Federal Government and the Capital Administration. Rather than resolving constitutional uncertainty, this clause postpones many essential governance questions to future legislation. Consequently, the constitutional status of Mogadishu remains incomplete which can be described as the Somali saying “Faanoole Fari kama qodna” meaning much work on the status remains undone.
Overall analysis is that the Article 63 contains several internal inconsistencies and conflicts with the Federal Electoral Law, particularly regarding Banadir’s representation in the Upper House. These contradictions may complicate constitutional implementation and generate future legal disputes. More fundamentally, the Constitution rejects earlier constitutional recommendations and ministerial proposals that favored granting Mogadishu the status of a Capital City State. Unfortunately, article 63 fails to reflect the aspirations of Mogadishu’s residents towards the option of the Capital status and this makes the constitution lacks the people’s legitimacy and acceptance.
an incapable Capital Administration as a result of the new constitution will lead to produce a weak Municipal Government that has not the capacity to meet the demands of a rapidly growing capital city with approximately more than 3 million population.
To address these concerns, I proposes several recommendations for the federal government with the close collaboration of other stakeholders.
1. Constitution of the Capital Administration should be made to establish clear institutional structures, powers, and responsibilities.
2. The Federal Government should reduce excessive centralization by devolving clearly defined powers to the capital.
3. All relevant stakeholders should participate in designing stable institutions capable of preventing future constitutional disputes.
4. Article 63 should be reopened and revised to remove ambiguities, resolve contradictions, and clearly define Mogadishu’s constitutional status.
5. Finally, the Capital Administration should be granted broader authority similar to that exercised by major capitals worldwide, including powers over local security, political affairs, taxation, administration, representation, and urban development. Such reforms would enable Mogadishu to function as an effective Capital Administration while safeguarding the interests of its residents and strengthening the federal system.
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Abdulkadir Muhyadin Ahmed (Dalha) is a senior practitioner in local government and urban development, with academic training in public administration and development studies.
Email: Abdikadirdalha@gmail.com
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The opinions expressed in this article are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of Dawan Africa.