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“A soldier should never be forced to choose between loyalty to the national flag and loyalty to his own clan.” Hussein Shegow Mohamed
In early June 2026, violence shook Mogadishu. Smoke rose over Howlwadaag, gunfire echoed across the capital, and armed men occupied streets where children usually play. The government said security forces were responding to armed opposition groups, while opposition figures alleged that state forces targeted residences associated with former senior officials.
I cannot say who fired first; the accounts conflict. But Somalis have seen this pattern before.
The UN, EU and Britain urged restraint, while the US embassy described the violence as “reckless.” Their concern was justified. Why must outsiders remind Somali leaders that security forces belong to no political party?
A national army must protect every citizen, regardless of clan or political affiliation. Somalia has spent more than a decade building such a force, supported by Türkiye, the United States, Britain and the European Union. Specialised units have been trained and equipped to fight al-Shabaab.
Yet the April 2021 political crisis exposed how fragile that project remained. Some soldiers aligned with clan-linked opposition leaders. The UN mission warned against using security forces for political purposes and expressed concern over clan divisions in the army. Five years later, that warning remains relevant.
It is easy to accuse Somali soldiers of clan loyalty. It is also unfair. Many serve bravely despite difficult conditions and delayed salaries, losing colleagues in the fight against al-Shabaab.
The problem begins with political leaders. Critics argue that constitutional amendments approved by parliament in March 2026 could extend federal mandates and delay elections. The government continues to pursue one-person, one-vote elections, while opposition leaders and key federal member states, including Puntland and Jubaland, reject the amendments and maintain that the 2012 Provisional Constitution remains the governing framework.
The dispute deepened on 5 November when the Supreme Court ruled that the amendments did not automatically extend the mandates of sitting federal institutions. The Attorney General’s Office rejected the ruling, challenging its legal basis. This has added another layer of disagreement to an already unsettled political situation.
Both camps claim constitutional legitimacy, but no political settlement has been accepted by all sides. As talks stall, pressure shifts to the security forces.
Neither side openly wants conflict, but each takes threatening steps. Reports of armed groups aligned with opposition figures have raised concerns about the influence of clan and political loyalties on security arrangements. The government, meanwhile, depends on units it regards as loyal. Each calls its actions defensive; each deepens the other’s fears.
Divided loyalties reflect longstanding failures of political leadership.
Clan-based units. Recruitment, command appointments and deployments can reflect clan calculations. That may secure short-term bargains but weakens national cohesion.
Irregular salaries and supplies. When pay is delayed, soldiers may turn to elders or politicians for support, leaving them vulnerable to outside influence.
Politically favoured units. Leaders invest in forces they trust, increasing the risk that specialised counterterrorism units will be used to protect political interests.
Competing chains of command. Federal and regional forces answer to different authorities. Without agreed rules, coordination gives way to overlapping commands.
Opposition figures have accused government forces of targeting political rivals, while the authorities maintain that their operations were responses to armed groups threatening security. These claims remain contested. But national forces lose public confidence when they become entangled in political confrontations.
Al-Shabaab benefits when Somali forces face one another. Every hour spent confronting fellow soldiers in Mogadishu is time not spent in areas where the group still collects taxes, recruits fighters and maintains influence. Heavy weapons intended for counter-insurgency operations were reportedly used during the June violence, raising concerns about security elsewhere.
The group need not defeat the army directly. Political division, distracted security forces and weakened public trust can all create opportunities for it.
When mortars strike neighbourhoods such as Howlwadaag and Hodan, families bear the consequences. Parents keep children indoors, shopkeepers lose income, and people displaced by conflict or drought may have to move again.
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While gathering humanitarian data in Bakool and other parts of South West State, I spoke with displaced families who had finally found shelter and modest livelihoods. I saw how easily those gains could disappear. Violence in the capital also unsettles communities far from the politicians making these decisions.
For families facing uncertainty, protection comes down to one question: will we be safe enough to stay here tonight?
Somalia does not lack recommendations. It lacks the political will to act.
Agree on political rules. The government, opposition and member states must agree on elections and the constitutional framework. Security reforms cannot endure while the rules for transferring power remain disputed.
Keep armed forces out of political rivalries. All sides should pledge not to bring clan-affiliated armed groups into the capital or use state forces against political opponents. International partners could monitor this.
Pay soldiers reliably. Verified direct payments, payroll audits and biometric registration can curb interference and ghost workers.
Protect specialised units. Forces trained to fight terrorism must not be diverted to political protection or domestic power struggles. Training partners should reinforce that principle.
Clarify security responsibilities. Federal and member-state leaders must agree on command, coordination and the allocation of security duties and resources.
Protect civilians. All parties should agree on clear rules for armed deployments in Mogadishu, particularly in residential neighbourhoods.
Some will argue that the government must uphold law and order and cannot allow armed groups to operate freely in the capital. That concern is legitimate; opposition leaders should not defend the presence of rival armed formations.
Others will argue that opposition figures armed themselves because they saw no fair political process. That concern also deserves attention. Disarmament is more credible when accompanied by impartial institutions and a trustworthy political path.
Order without fairness may deepen resistance; political competition without security may turn violent. Both problems must be addressed together.
Somalia stepped back from danger in 2021, when a decision to extend the presidential term was reversed and political talks resumed with the help of elders. That should be a lesson, not a source of complacency.
The flag on every soldier’s shoulder represents all Somalis, not only those sharing his clan or political loyalties. Until leaders agree on legitimate rules for acquiring and transferring power, the armed forces will remain exposed to political pressure and distracted from defending the country against extremist groups.
Somali soldiers should serve the nation, not competing political interests. It is the responsibility of political leaders to make that possible.
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Hussein Shegow Mohamed is a Somali writer and political and security analyst. His work focuses on Somalia’s security, governance and sustainable peace.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of Dawan Africa.