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“Military victories cannot secure lasting peace when the institutions needed to protect communities, deliver justice and sustain public trust remain absent.” By Hussein Shegow Mohamed.
On August 2, after two days of fighting, Al-Shabaab fighters captured Teedan, a settlement roughly 55 miles east of Beledweyne. The news attracted little attention beyond the surrounding area. Yet government forces had held the settlement since the 2022 counteroffensive, which many Somalis regarded as evidence that the tide was turning.
Analysts now suggest that much of the campaign’s progress in central Somalia has been reversed. Once a symbol of progress, Teedan illustrates how quickly military gains can unravel.
The problem is not a lack of courage among Somali soldiers, nor does it mean military force is unnecessary. Rather, Somalia continues to ask its armed forces to perform tasks that belong to a functioning state.
The military’s achievements deserve recognition. In a September assessment, the International Crisis Group rejected suggestions that the Somali state was approaching collapse. It noted significant improvements in Mogadishu’s security and continued federal government control over most major cities.
Lieutenant General Sam Kavuma, commander of the African Union force, similarly stated that Al-Shabaab had not captured new territory since March 2025 and had been driven from several areas.
These are significant achievements that should not be dismissed, particularly by those who remember Mogadishu’s darkest years.
Yet the broader picture remains contested. Analysts at ACLED reported that Al-Shabaab had recaptured nearly 60 towns and villages across southern Somalia during the preceding year. Another assessment found that attacks in Lower Shabelle increased by approximately 60% between June and August compared with the first five months of the year, as the group sought to strengthen its position along roads leading to Mogadishu.
These accounts partly reflect different definitions of territorial control. The International Crisis Group itself acknowledged that Al-Shabaab had recaptured several areas previously transferred to Somali forces.
A town that changes hands twice has not been secured.
General Kavuma captured the central challenge when he acknowledged that the Al-Shabaab problem could not be solved by guns alone. Coming from a field commander, that observation deserves particular attention.
What remains when the army moves on? In too many places, very little.
Al-Shabaab’s resilience rests partly on its ability to impose a form of order, however coercive. Its courts offer a revealing example. One Baidoa resident estimated that the group handles approximately 80% of local land disputes, compared with 20% handled by government courts. This is an individual assessment rather than a verified statistical finding, but it reflects concerns documented in broader research.
Studies by organizations including Hiraal, Saferworld and the International Crisis Group have examined why some Somalis perceive the group’s dispute-resolution mechanisms as more effective than government institutions.
Reports describe judges being rotated and their clan identities concealed to reduce perceptions of bias. More importantly, the group can enforce its rulings, while government court decisions frequently face enforcement difficulties.
None of this makes Al-Shabaab legitimate. The organization uses intimidation, violence and coercion to impose its authority. Its attacks have killed hundreds of civilians, and its justice system operates without the protections associated with independent courts.
Nevertheless, its ability to exploit institutional weaknesses helps explain why military victories alone cannot restore government authority.
Communities need more than the removal of armed fighters. They need accessible courts, reliable policing, effective administration and confidence that disputes will be resolved fairly.
The most difficult obstacles may be political rather than military.
Disagreements over Somalia’s electoral arrangements and the distribution of authority between Mogadishu and the federal member states have deepened institutional tensions.
Puntland and Jubaland have suspended cooperation with the federal government, while South West State halted collaboration in March, alleging interference in its internal political and security affairs. Fighting between opposition groups and government-aligned forces in Mogadishu in June caused casualties and displacement.
ACLED analysts have warned that internal political confrontations divert government attention and resources from counterinsurgency operations.
Disagreements also surround the electoral timetable, including proposed parliamentary elections on April 15 and a presidential election on May 15. Opposition groups and the administrations of Puntland and Jubaland have challenged the arrangements.
These divisions complicate security coordination, weaken political trust and make it harder to establish a unified command structure.
A military campaign cannot deliver lasting stability when the institutions responsible for sustaining its gains remain divided.
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Financial and logistical pressures present another serious challenge.
In July, the United States informed partners that it intended to end support after 2026 for the United Nations Support Office in Somalia, which provides logistical assistance to African Union forces.
The African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) faces a mandate deadline of December 31, 2026, while uncertainty over international financing has accelerated discussions about troop reductions and the transfer of responsibilities.
The International Crisis Group has warned that separate bilateral military deployments, without a coordinated framework, could create competing spheres of influence and security gaps that Al-Shabaab might exploit.
Somali forces also continue to face capability shortages. General Kavuma has identified insufficient ground troops, limited naval capacity and inadequate air assets, including surveillance aircraft, among the challenges.
The expectation that Somalia should assume greater security responsibilities is understandable. However, the transition must reflect the country’s actual institutional and financial capacity.
Security cannot be separated from the conditions in which ordinary Somalis live.
Nearly 6.5 million people face high levels of food insecurity, while more than 1.8 million children are projected to suffer acute malnutrition in 2026.
More than 500,000 people have reportedly been displaced during the year, joining approximately 3.3 million already uprooted. Drought accounts for most of the recent displacement.
Meanwhile, humanitarian funding remains severely inadequate. By late April, only 14% of requested assistance had been received. The World Food Programme has reduced food assistance, leaving approximately 600,000 beneficiaries.
These figures represent more than a humanitarian emergency. They describe communities whose vulnerability can be exploited by armed organizations.
A displaced family without employment, land or reliable assistance may face pressure from anyone offering money, food or protection. Armed groups understand these vulnerabilities and can use them to expand their influence.
Humanitarian assistance is therefore not a substitute for security operations, but it is an essential part of building the conditions in which lasting security becomes possible.
If military force alone is insufficient, Somalia needs a broader strategy connecting security operations with governance, justice and political reconciliation.
Soldiers must receive their salaries regularly. Police officers, judges and civil administrators should accompany military advances rather than arrive months later. Courts must issue credible decisions that can be enforced, while traditional elders and local mediators should be integrated into dispute-resolution mechanisms where appropriate.
Former fighters willing to abandon violence also need credible pathways towards reintegration, subject to accountability and community protection.
Above all, Mogadishu and the federal member states must establish workable political agreements on elections and security responsibilities. Such arrangements need not resolve every disagreement immediately, but they must create sufficient trust for coordinated action.
International partners, meanwhile, should develop a realistic financing and transition framework beyond 2026 rather than allow funding deadlines to determine the pace of security handovers.
Somalia has repeatedly demonstrated that its people are willing to fight for their country. What remains insufficient is the political consensus, institutional capacity and sustained investment needed to transform battlefield victories into lasting stability.
A town is not truly liberated simply because armed fighters have withdrawn. It is secured when its residents trust the authority that replaces them.
Until that happens, the war will continue to produce temporary victories, and the map will keep changing.
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*Hussein Shegow Mohamed is a Somali writer and political and security analyst. His work focuses on Somalia’s security, governance and sustainable peace.
**The opinions expressed in this article are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of Dawan Africa.