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“Somalia’s political future depends not on defeating opponents, but on building institutions where cooperation becomes safer than confrontation for everyone.” Dr. Abdullahi Ali Noor (Americo)
Ask someone at a café in Mogadishu, Garowe or Baidoa about the latest political meetings, and the response may be a shrug. They might mention constitutional disputes or electoral disagreements, but few have the patience to follow every development.
For decades, political and clan anxieties kept ordinary Somalis intensely engaged in national disputes. Today, growing political fatigue appears to have shifted attention toward daily survival, business and local security.
This public detachment presents an opportunity for institutional change: exploring a temporary, inclusive coalition government bringing together the Federal Government, Federal Member States (FMS) and opposition parties to oversee mutually accepted federal elections.
Such an arrangement would require agreement among the relevant political institutions and compliance with applicable constitutional procedures. Rather than treating compromise as surrender, Somalia’s leaders could use it to rebuild confidence and prevent another electoral confrontation.
Game theory offers a useful explanation for Somalia’s recurring political paralysis, particularly through the concept of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
In this model, competing actors must decide whether to cooperate or pursue their interests independently. Cooperation produces a better collective outcome, but mutual distrust encourages defensive choices that leave everyone worse off.
Somalia’s political landscape reflects aspects of this dilemma. Federal authorities may fear that concessions could weaken constitutional authority, while opposition groups and regional administrations express concerns about electoral procedures, centralization and constitutional changes.
If both sides cooperate, a negotiated arrangement could produce stability and credible elections. If one cooperates while the other exploits the agreement, the cooperating side risks political marginalization. If both refuse cooperation, institutional paralysis continues.
Political scientist Robert Axelrod demonstrated how repeated interactions can encourage cooperation when actors recognize the long-term benefits of mutual restraint.
A temporary coalition could change these incentives by reducing the perceived consequences of political defeat and establishing shared responsibility for an agreed electoral process.
Three political theories help explain how such an arrangement might work.
Arend Lijphart’s theory of consociational democracy emphasizes executive power-sharing, proportional representation and protections for competing groups in deeply divided societies.
George Tsebelis’s theory of veto players highlights actors whose agreement is necessary for major policy changes. Incorporating relevant political institutions into an agreed decision-making framework could reduce incentives for unilateral action.
Francis Fukuyama’s work on social trust offers another lesson: institutions struggle when political relationships are dominated by suspicion. Transparent negotiations and repeated cooperation can gradually rebuild confidence.
However, inclusion must be balanced with effective governance. Excessive veto powers could reproduce the paralysis a coalition seeks to overcome.
One objection to power-sharing is that the Federal Government possesses constitutional governing authority while opposition parties do not hold an equivalent executive mandate.
This distinction matters. Federal institutions and Federal Member States exercise responsibilities derived from the constitutional framework, while opposition parties represent political constituencies without automatically acquiring governmental authority.
Their roles should not be treated as legally interchangeable. Nevertheless, broad political participation can strengthen public confidence when disagreements concern the rules governing elections.
A transitional coalition would therefore require a lawful basis, agreement among relevant institutions and clearly defined responsibilities. Properly constituted, it could broaden political ownership of the electoral process without disregarding existing constitutional mandates.
Its purpose should be to facilitate an agreed transition, not permanently distribute public offices among competing political elites.
Somalia’s political calculations are also shaped by regional diplomatic developments and competing strategic interests.
The recent El Alamein Joint Declaration involving Somalia, Egypt, Eritrea and Sudan reflects evolving regional alignments against the backdrop of Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions.
These developments do not necessarily establish direct interference in Somalia’s domestic political process. Nevertheless, regional rivalries can complicate negotiations when domestic actors perceive external relationships as alternatives to national dialogue.
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Somalia’s political stakeholders should therefore ensure that regional partnerships support sovereignty, institutional stability and constructive diplomacy.
Any coalition arrangement would benefit from transparent decision-making and safeguards that preserve domestic ownership of political agreements.
Institutional design alone cannot resolve Somalia’s political divisions. Political behavior and communication matter equally.
The Quranic instruction, “And speak to people kindly” (وَقُولُوا لِلنَّاسِ حُسْنًا), from Surah Al-Baqarah (2:83), provides an ethical foundation for respectful engagement.
In an environment shaped by suspicion, inflammatory rhetoric can reinforce defensive reactions. Respectful dialogue, by contrast, creates room for negotiation without requiring political actors to abandon their principles.
This approach also reflects the Somali tradition of Sulh, or reconciliation, which prioritizes negotiated settlement and the restoration of relationships.
Political compromise is not necessarily weakness. It can be a deliberate decision to protect national institutions from prolonged confrontation.
African experiences demonstrate both the possibilities and limitations of coalition arrangements.
South Africa’s 2024 Government of National Unity was established through negotiated agreements intended to guide cooperation among participating parties. Its experience illustrates the importance of written commitments, although political agreements alone cannot guarantee lasting stability.
Kenya’s 2008 Grand Coalition helped contain a severe post-election crisis and contributed to an environment in which constitutional reform became possible, culminating in the 2010 Constitution.
Zimbabwe’s 2009 power-sharing arrangement, however, exposed the difficulties coalitions face when mistrust persists and agreed reforms remain contested.
Experiences in Lesotho similarly demonstrate how coalition governments can become unstable when political disagreements undermine governing arrangements.
For Somalia, these precedents suggest that inclusion must be accompanied by enforceable commitments, transparent procedures and clearly defined electoral responsibilities.
Without these safeguards, a coalition risks becoming another temporary agreement among political elites.
The recent invitation to opposition groups, including the Somali Future Council and National Unity Forum, to participate in national dialogue offers an opportunity for renewed engagement.
However, dialogue must produce more than declarations of goodwill.
Any transitional arrangement should have a clearly established legal foundation, an agreed electoral timetable, credible dispute-resolution mechanisms and defined limits on executive authority.
It should also respect the constitutional responsibilities of Federal Member States and protect electoral institutions from partisan interference.
Public confidence will depend not simply on who participates in government, but on whether the resulting agreement produces credible institutions and transparent elections.
Somalia’s political future cannot depend indefinitely on agreements reached only when another constitutional or electoral confrontation becomes unavoidable.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma illustrates why competing actors can remain trapped in destructive behavior even when cooperation offers a better outcome.
An inclusive, constitutionally grounded coalition could provide one possible path forward, provided it serves institutional reform rather than political survival.
Ultimately, Somalia’s leaders face a choice between repeating familiar confrontations and establishing rules that make cooperation possible.
For citizens increasingly concerned with livelihoods, security and stability, the measure of political leadership is not who wins the latest confrontation, but whether the country can finally escape the cycle itself.
Dr Abdullahi Ali Noor (Ameriko) is a pharmaceutical regulatory expert with over 25 years of corporate leadership and experience in European/Regulatory. He writes about civic education.
**The opinions expressed in this article are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of Dawan Africa.