Opinion : Beyond Security: What the Kampala Summit Means for Somalia

Sovereignty remains a defining principle of international law, yet its contemporary exercise is often more complex than the classical Westphalian model suggests.

In Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States (2004), political scientist Stephen D. Krasner argues that fragile states may retain their legal sovereignty while voluntarily sharing the exercise of essential state functions with international partners.

Such arrangements do not diminish statehood. Rather, they preserve it where domestic institutions lack the capacity to perform those functions independently.

The Second Extraordinary Summit of the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) to the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), held in Kampala on 31 July 2026, illustrates that proposition.

Convened primarily to address Somalia’s security transition and the future financing of AUSSOM, the Summit ultimately produced an official record that reached beyond military operations. It highlighted an increasingly recognised principle: durable security cannot be separated from political reconciliation.

The legal significance of the Summit lies not in the President’s closing press conference alone, but in its official record, comprising the President’s remarks, the communiqué adopted by the participating states and the Rapporteur’s concluding announcement.

Although the communiqué is not a legally binding instrument, it provides authoritative evidence of the collective political position adopted by the participating states and therefore constitutes the appropriate basis for analysing the Summit’s institutional and legal implications.

Read together, these documents provide the proper basis for assessing the relationship between security, political reconciliation and the exercise of sovereign authority in Somalia.

At the closing press conference, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud explained that he had opposed including Somalia’s domestic political dispute in the final communiqué, stating that “political matters of Somalia are internal” and that “local politics of Somalia must not be internationalised or regionalised.”

 In legal terms, that position reflects the classical Westphalian understanding of sovereignty, under which domestic political affairs fall within the state’s exclusive jurisdiction.

The communiqué, however, reflected a broader institutional approach. While political rather than legally binding, it articulated the collective understanding of the participating governments regarding the relationship between security, effective governance and political reconciliation.

Point 2 called for “a unified Somalia to rebuild national confidence, democratic governance and strengthen national state institutions,” recognising that these objectives are mutually reinforcing. The official record therefore extended beyond military cooperation alone.

Whatever discussions preceded the adoption of the communiqué, its final text represents the collective political position of the participating states and provides the appropriate foundation for legal analysis.

The Summit’s position became clearer in the Rapporteur’s closing statement. According to that statement, the participating Heads of State requested President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to convene an inclusive conference of Somali political leaders and the Federal Member States, with the Heads of State and Government of the Troop Contributing Countries participating as observers, at the earliest opportunity.

Although the request was political rather than legally binding, it was clearly not incidental. It reflected the collective assessment of the governments whose troops, political commitment and financial support continue to underpin Somalia’s internationally mandated stabilisation mission. It recognised that military progress alone cannot secure a durable peace without an accompanying political settlement.

The timing of the Summit reinforces that conclusion. It followed the United States’ notification to the African Union that it would not support the continuation of the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) beyond 31 December 2026.

 The communiqué itself reflects this changing financial environment through its emphasis on resource mobilisation, sustainable financing and the future of AUSSOM. Read together, the communiqué and the United States’ memorandum indicate that Somalia’s international partners increasingly view political reconciliation not as a separate domestic issue, but as an essential element of long-term stabilisation.

The request for an inclusive political conference should therefore be understood as part of a broader strategy aimed at strengthening confidence in Somalia’s transition and sustaining international engagement.

Stephen D. Krasner’s concept of shared sovereignty, set out in Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States (2004), provides a useful analytical framework for understanding the Kampala record.