For more than seventy years, the Palestinian question has remained the central axis of Middle Eastern politics. It is a conflict that transcends borders, shaping alliances, legitimizing resistance, and testing the credibility of international law.
Any serious discussion of peace in the region must therefore confront not only political realities but also legal and moral foundations. Within this context, the Arab Peace Initiative (2002) and the Abraham Accords (2020) stand as two competing frameworks that reflect fundamentally different approaches to conflict resolution.
The Arab Peace Initiative emerged at a moment of rare Arab consensus. Adopted at the Beirut Summit, it was designed as a comprehensive and principled offer: full normalization with Israel in exchange for withdrawal from occupied territories, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and a just solution to the refugee question based on international law. Its logic was sequential and conditional. Peace was not an entry point, but an outcome—earned through compliance with internationally recognized norms.
At its core, the Arab Peace Initiative sought to institutionalize justice as the basis of regional order. By grounding its provisions in the UN Charter and Security Council resolutions, it elevated the Palestinian issue from a bilateral dispute to a matter of international legality.
Even though Israel rejected the initiative and global enforcement mechanisms proved weak, the framework retained enduring political and moral weight. It preserved Arab unity, safeguarded Palestinian rights, and offered a roadmap for a comprehensive settlement rather than a piecemeal accommodation.
The Abraham Accords represent a stark departure from this paradigm. Signed nearly two decades later, they were framed as a breakthrough for peace, yet they redefined peace itself. Rather than addressing occupation, borders, refugees, or Jerusalem, the accords prioritized immediate normalization between Israel and selected Arab states. The Palestinian issue was deliberately removed from the negotiating table, treated as an obstacle rather than a prerequisite.
This shift reflects a broader transformation in regional politics, where state-centric interests—security cooperation, economic integration, and strategic alignment—have eclipsed collective Arab commitments. Proponents of the Abraham Accords argue that the agreements reflect pragmatic realism, enabling states to pursue their national interests without being held hostage to an intractable conflict. However, realism detached from legality and justice carries structural risks.
One critical point of comparison lies in the concept of leverage. The Arab Peace Initiative used normalization as leverage to compel Israeli compliance with international law. The Abraham Accords, by contrast, granted normalization upfront, surrendering leverage without securing concessions on core issues. This reversal altered the balance of incentives, signaling that occupation no longer constitutes a diplomatic liability.
Another key difference concerns international law and normative order. The Arab Peace Initiative reinforced the principle that territory cannot be acquired by force and that prolonged occupation remains illegal regardless of political convenience.
The Abraham Accords weakened this norm by normalizing relations without addressing the legality of Israel’s actions in occupied territories. In doing so, they contributed to the erosion of the principle of non-recognition of unlawful situations—a cornerstone of international legal order.
The impact on Arab unity is equally telling. The Arab Peace Initiative represented a collective Arab voice, projecting cohesion and shared responsibility. The Abraham Accords fragmented this consensus, transforming a regional cause into a set of bilateral calculations. This fragmentation not only weakened collective bargaining power but also deepened political polarization within the Arab world itself.
Beyond legal and diplomatic dimensions, the two frameworks diverge sharply in their treatment of Palestinian agency. The Arab Peace Initiative placed Palestinians at the center of the peace equation, recognizing them as a people with inalienable rights. The Abraham Accords rendered them peripheral, effectively reducing the conflict to a background issue to be managed rather than resolved.
This marginalization has fueled disillusionment and reinforced perceptions that international diplomacy has abandoned the pursuit of justice.
Supporters of the Abraham Accords often point to tangible gains: expanded trade, technological cooperation, and new security architectures.
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These developments are real and measurable. Yet they raise a fundamental question: can economic normalization substitute for political resolution? History suggests otherwise. Economic incentives may soften tensions, but they cannot erase grievances rooted in dispossession and inequality.
The comparison ultimately reveals two distinct philosophies of peace. The Arab Peace Initiative is normative and transformational, seeking to resolve the conflict by correcting its root causes. The Abraham Accords are managerial and transactional, aiming to stabilize the region by bypassing those causes. One aspires to end the conflict; the other to contain it.
Conclusion
Peace in the Middle East cannot be sustained through omission. Agreements that ignore the Palestinian question may produce short-term diplomatic calm, but they entrench long-term instability. The erosion of international law, the normalization of occupation, and the marginalization of an entire people carry consequences that extend far beyond bilateral relations.
Reviving the Arab Peace Initiative—or advancing a comparable framework that restores conditionality, legality, and collective responsibility—is not an exercise in nostalgia. It is a strategic imperative. Without anchoring peace in justice, normalization risks becoming an illusion: orderly on the surface, fragile at its core.
A durable regional order requires confronting the conflict, not circumnavigating it—and placing Palestine back where it belongs, at the center of any credible path to peace.
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Avv. Omar Abdulle “Dhagey” is a Somali legal and political analyst specializing in governance and institutional reform.
Email: omardhagey@gmail.com
The opinion expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Dawan Africa



