Opinion:Breaking Somalia’s Political Game Cycle: The Hamze Model (2-3)

 “Political alignment creates continuity, and continuity gives governments the time and space needed to deliver measurable results.” Mohamed Dhugad

In part I, I examined Somalia’s recurring cycle of confrontation between Presidents and Prime Ministers and ended with the question: why has the relationship between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Prime Minister Hamze Abdi Barre survived where so many others failed?

Part of the answer lies in something that is often overlooked in Somali political analysis: the personal and political history between the two men.

President Hassan Sheikh did not select Hamze Abdi Barre from a pool of unfamiliar candidates or as a concession to political bargaining. He chose a colleague. A man who had worked alongside him for more than a decade within their shared political party, the Peace and Development Party.

This was not a transactional political marriage of convenience. It was a decision rooted in trust, familiarity and a proven track record of collaboration.

This matters more than many observers realise. Previous presidents often appointed prime ministers who were relative strangers, political rivals brought in as concessions, or figures selected to satisfy external pressures or clan calculations.

The result was predictable: two men occupying the highest offices with no shared history, no established trust, and no political alignment. They were strangers thrown together in a high-stakes environment, and they quickly became competitors.

The absence of a pre-existing relationship meant that every disagreement was magnified, every misunderstanding became personal, and every political calculation was viewed through the lens of suspicion. 

Nevertheless, the answer lies beyond this.

It lies in what might be called the “Hamze Model”, a different philosophy of prime ministerial behaviour that stands in stark contrast to everything that came before.

First, Hamze has avoided constructing his premiership as an alternative centre of political authority. He has not behaved as though every exercise of presidential authority is an encroachment upon his own territory. That distinction matters enormously in Somalia.

A Prime Minister can have substantial executive responsibility without turning those responsibilities into a public contest with the President.

Second, Hamze has demonstrated political discipline without becoming politically passive. He has chaired Cabinet, directed government programmes, represented Somalia internationally, overseen ministerial performance and taken decisions on government appointments.

 The United Nations has repeatedly engaged him on Somalia’s priorities. He has been active without making competition the organising principle of his premiership.

Third, Hamze has understood that not every disagreement must become a public battle. The history of Somalia shows the enormous cost when political disagreements become personalised.

 Hamze has adopted a different philosophy: preserve the relationship, solve disagreements internally where possible, maintain the chain of political authority and keep the machinery of government functioning.

Fourth, Hamze has refused to weaponize clan identity. He has not used his Jubaland origins against the President. He has not positioned himself as the defender of one region against another. He has not allowed constituency pressures to become an instrument of executive conflict.

 This is not because clan pressures have disappeared. It is because Hamze has chosen not to weaponize them while still focusing on the greater good of his constituency and the nation.

 Some may interpret this close alignment as excessive loyalty or political subordination. That criticism deserves to be heard. But it rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of what the Prime Minister’s office is supposed to be.

A Prime Minister is not supposed to be the President’s political opponent. The President and Prime Minister are part of the same executive and are expected to work together to govern the country. Their differences should be managed within government, not turned into a permanent struggle for political supremacy.

The responsibility for challenging, scrutinising and correcting government policy belongs primarily to Parliament, political parties and other institutions of accountability. This political layer has often been weak or absent in Somalia.

 As a result, disagreements that should have been handled through political institutions were too often absorbed into the executive itself, turning the President and Prime Minister into rival centres of power.