By Mohamed Dubo - Director of SOMINVEST, with extensive experience in strategic communications, investment promotion, and economic diplomacy.
“In politics, demonstrations are not merely expressions of anger; they are stress tests of state capacity. Where institutions are strong, protests can deepen democracy. Where institutions remain fragile, the streets can quickly become battlefields from which nations take decades to recover”.
In fragile states, the choreography of mass protest is rarely spontaneous. It is organised through layered networks of political patronage, urban mobilisation structures, identity coalitions and emotionally charged narratives that transform social frustration into collective political action.
In some African countries with relatively mature political systems, opposition movements have refined street demonstrations into a recurring instrument of bargaining between elites and the state. Protest has, in many cases, become institutionalised — part theatre, part negotiation and part pressure campaign.
Such demonstrations often follow a recognisable pattern. Economic grievances merge with constitutional language. Electoral disputes are framed as existential struggles for justice.
Organisers cultivate symbolic martyrdom, amplify perceptions of exclusion and exploit urban density to build momentum. Informal transport unions, student groups, labour associations and neighbourhood networks become logistical channels for mobilisation, while digital media ecosystems magnify outrage and convert frustration into disciplined street action.
Yet the transferability of this model to fragile post-conflict societies remains deeply questionable.
For countries emerging from prolonged state collapse, mass demonstrations carry risks that extend far beyond democratic expression. In environments where institutions remain weak, security structures fragmented and public trust underdeveloped, popular protest can rapidly mutate into destabilisation.
What functions as democratic pressure in consolidated political systems may instead trigger systemic breakdown in fragile ones.
The central issue is not whether citizens possess the right to protest. Political participation remains fundamental to any constitutional order. The real question is whether the structural conditions necessary for safe and constructive mass mobilisation actually exist.
Political science offers a useful distinction between institutionalised contention and volatile contention. Institutionalised contention occurs where political actors broadly accept the legitimacy of the state, constitutional succession and the monopoly of violence. Demonstrations in such systems, while disruptive at times, operate within recognised political boundaries.
Volatile contention, however, emerges where institutions lack legitimacy, coercive authority is fragmented and political competition remains existential. In such systems, demonstrations are rarely interpreted as mere civic expression; they are perceived as struggles over survival, dominance and access to power. Somalia remains firmly within this second category.
Three structural realities make large-scale political demonstrations particularly dangerous in Somalia.
The first is the incomplete consolidation of state authority. Although Somalia has made significant progress over the past decade, the state still exercises uneven control over territory, security and political administration. Federalism remains contested, jurisdictional ambiguities persist and security responsibilities are distributed across multiple actors whose coordination is often inconsistent.
Under such conditions, mass demonstrations can create dangerous command-and-control dilemmas. A protest that begins as political theatre can quickly evolve into a security crisis if different actors interpret events differently or respond asymmetrically.
The second factor is the enduring salience of clan-mediated political identity. In more consolidated democracies, demonstrations are often organised around ideological, economic or partisan cleavages. In Somalia, however, political mobilisation frequently intersects with kinship structures and historical grievances, creating a heightened risk of communal interpretation.
What begins as opposition activism can easily be reframed through the lens of collective group competition. Crowd psychology in fragile societies is rarely neutral; it is shaped by memory, fear and unresolved trauma.
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The danger lies not only in violence itself, but also in political signalling. Once demonstrations become associated with clan alignment, the state’s response — whether restrained or forceful — can be interpreted as favouring or targeting specific communities. This accelerates distrust and weakens already fragile national cohesion.
The third factor is the absence of a deeply institutionalised democratic culture. Democracy is not merely the existence of elections or constitutions. It also requires behavioural norms: tolerance of defeat, confidence in institutions, acceptance of procedural legitimacy and rejection of extra-constitutional escalation.
These norms take decades to mature. In societies emerging from civil conflict, political actors often continue to perceive power through zero-sum calculations. Opposition groups may view demonstrations as opportunities to delegitimise the state entirely rather than influence policy incrementally. Governments, meanwhile, may interpret protests not as civic dissent but as precursors to insurrection.
This mutual suspicion creates what political scientists describe as a “security dilemma within civilian politics,” in which each side escalates defensively while believing the other intends existential harm.
History offers sobering examples of how large-scale demonstrations in weak states can spiral into catastrophe. During the Arab Spring in Libya, protests that initially emerged as political dissent rapidly evolved into violent fragmentation once state institutions collapsed. The absence of unified security structures and credible transition mechanisms allowed militias and competing factions to seize control, pushing the country into prolonged instability.
A similarly tragic trajectory unfolded in Syria. Initial protests demanding reform escalated into militarised conflict after political trust collapsed and coercive responses intensified public anger. What began as demonstrations transformed into one of the century’s deadliest humanitarian disasters.
The rise of digital media has further intensified these vulnerabilities. In fragile states, information ecosystems are highly susceptible to manipulation, disinformation and emotional amplification. Rumours spread faster than institutions can respond. Images detached from context inflame public sentiment, while diaspora networks — often physically distant from immediate consequences — can unintentionally radicalise domestic political discourse through absolutist rhetoric and online mobilisation campaigns.
Somalia’s economic fragility compounds the risk. Large demonstrations in heavily urbanised centres can paralyse commerce, disrupt transportation and weaken already vulnerable livelihoods. In advanced economies, prolonged protests may produce temporary economic losses. In fragile economies dependent on informal trade and daily income generation, even short disruptions can deepen social volatility.
None of this implies that political dissent should be suppressed. On the contrary, peaceful criticism and organised opposition are indispensable components of democratic development. But fragile states require sequencing. The consolidation of institutions must precede the normalisation of confrontational mass politics.
Strong courts, trusted electoral bodies, professional security forces and credible mechanisms for elite bargaining are prerequisites for stable protest politics — not consequences of them.
The lessons from several African political systems are therefore often misunderstood. Observers tend to focus on the visibility of demonstrations rather than the invisible institutional foundations beneath them. What appears chaotic from afar may, in reality, operate within relatively stable political boundaries developed over decades of contested but continuous statehood.
Somalia has not yet reached that stage.
Its priority remains state consolidation, institutional legitimacy and political stabilisation. The premature importation of high-intensity protest politics into an unconsolidated political order risks transforming democratic participation into systemic fragility. In post-conflict societies, the line between mobilisation and destabilisation remains perilously thin.
The tragedy of fragile states is that they often attempt to imitate the political behaviour of stronger democracies before acquiring the institutional resilience that makes such behaviour survivable.
* Mohamed Dubo is the Director of SOMINVEST, with extensive experience in strategic communications, investment promotion, and economic diplomacy.
*The opinions expressed in this article are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of Dawan Africa.