Opinion: Rebuilding Trust and Restoring Somalia’s Unfinished Unity

 “Unity is not a return to 1960, but a new beginning that respects diversity, distributes power fairly, and places the Somali citizen—not the political elite—at the centre.”— — Mohamed Mahmoud Fidow

Somalia is among the countries that have long suffered from the legacy of colonialism and partition. Its territories across the Horn of Africa once formed a single geographic and human entity before being divided among several colonial powers, dispersing the Somali people and splitting their lands between Britain, Italy, France, Ethiopia and Kenya.

Despite this, Somalis did not surrender to this reality. Instead, they waged political and armed resistance in defence of their land, identity and unity.

With Somalia’s independence and the union of British and Italian Somaliland on July 1, 1960, a new phase of state-building and the restoration of unity began. Yet the project of Somali unity remained incomplete because parts of Somali territory remained outside the newly independent state.

This is why national unity remains a historical wound that has yet to fully heal, underscoring the need to examine the causes of its shortcomings and work to restore unity on foundations that safeguard the country’s sovereignty and fulfil the aspirations of its people.

When the northern regions gained independence from British colonial rule on June 26, 1960, they moved in good faith towards their brothers in the southern regions and joined the unity project without setting prior conditions or entering negotiations over how the union would be structured or how positions would be shared.

It is important here to correct some information. When the northern regions gained independence, while the southern regions had not yet achieved independence, several countries recognised the independence of the northern regions or congratulated them on the occasion.

This raises a question: Were those countries congratulating an entity called “Somaliland” alone, or did they consider those territories part of Somalia and the Somali people?

The answer is that those countries recognised the Somali state in its present form, comprising both north and south. Evidence of this is Pakistan, which said that another Islamic state had joined the United Nations. In my view, this weakens the argument advanced by some academics in Somaliland today, because they viewed Somalia—north and south—as one, with no distinction between them.

There is no doubt that our brothers in the northern regions took a step characterised by goodwill, despite the political interests of some northern Somali politicians at the time. Some sought positions and a greater share of power, but they feared confronting widespread public opposition in the northern regions, whose population was enthusiastic about seeing “Greater Somalia.”

From the beginning of the 1960s, some individuals with political interests from the north attempted to initiate movements aimed at weakening the union, at a time when the broader objective was to bring together the five parts of Somali territory.

Those attempts, however, failed because their proponents were few and found little support, culminating in an attempted coup during the presidency of Aden Abdulle Osman that ended in failure.

Afterwards, some adopted another approach: supporting whoever offered them a greater share of power. When a northerner held a senior executive or military position, he worked in favour of unity.

But when someone failed to secure a position, he would shift to claiming that Somaliland had been wronged and that unity had not been achieved in the way they had wanted.

From this, we can understand that the idea of separating the northern region existed and that unity had been incomplete since its formation; its foundations were not laid in the desired manner.

Everything should have been put in writing before unity was declared in July. Northern leaders made a mistake when they came to Mogadishu without clearly presenting their conditions and vision, because no one was pressuring them to do so.

Politics is not “charity”; rather, it is “give me this and I will give you that,” as one politician in Somaliland said in Hargeisa.

Southern politicians, in turn, made another mistake by failing to leave their northern brothers with a sufficient share of power.

Some politicians from Somaliland also changed their positions depending on the leaders who governed the country. Some who opposed unity during the presidency of Aden Abdulle Osman became supporters of it under President Siad Barre, and many such examples remain known today.

In the late 1980s, when President Siad Barre visited Hargeisa, some northerners called for resolving disputes with the front and addressing their grievances. According to what Ambassador Awil recently stated in one of his interviews, some of the demands included dismissing politicians, releasing detainees and similar measures.

Ambassador Awil himself is an example of shifting political positions. He opposed President Aden Abdulle Osman but later supported the government under President Siad Barre, worked for unity and held several positions during the revolutionary period.

I once had a conversation with an elderly man from the north and asked him: How can a solution be found that would bring the northern regions back into the fold of the Somali state?

He replied that they believed separation was the only solution and the best option for them. I asked him: What if we joined you instead, and we all became “Somaliland,” with you holding the positions?

He replied: “We would never trust you, no matter what happens, because you outnumber us, and after a short period you would take everything.”

From this, I realised that some people in Somaliland believe that returning to Somalia would make them a minority unable to influence Somali politics. They therefore prefer to protect their political interests by keeping the option of separation on the table.

This raises another question: How can we rebuild trust with our Somali brothers in the northern regions?