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“A battlefield victory is only the beginning; lasting security requires institutions that prevent militants from returning after soldiers move on.”Ali Mohamed Ali
Somalia’s Puntland military offensive against the Islamic State in Somalia has dealt a significant blow to a militant group that spent years establishing itself in the mountains of Bari.
Since Operation Hilaac began in December 2024, Puntland forces have driven ISIS fighters from several positions and sought to dismantle the networks that sustained the group in some of Somalia’s most difficult terrain.
Yet the campaign has also exposed the limits of military success. Driving militants from their strongholds does not necessarily prevent their return while they retain the ability to recruit, raise money and exploit security gaps. Developments in 2026 suggest that ISIS-Somalia, though weakened, remains capable of launching attacks and attempting to rebuild.
The stakes extend beyond the battlefield. The campaign tests Puntland’s ability to sustain a prolonged operation, secure recovered territory and restore community confidence. It also raises wider questions about how Somalia’s federal member states confront armed groups.
ISIS-Somalia emerged from a split within al-Shabaab, the al-Qaeda-linked group that has long dominated Somalia’s jihadist landscape. In October 2015, Abdulkadir Mumin, a former al-Shabaab figure, pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, then leader of the Islamic State.
Lacking the manpower for conventional battles, Mumin’s followers established themselves in the mountains of Bari, particularly Cal Miskaad, where caves, narrow valleys and difficult routes offered protection from larger military formations. The terrain concealed fighters, supplies and training sites, allowing even a relatively small group to withstand repeated military pressure.
The group generated revenue through extortion, imposing payments known locally as baad on businesses and traders in an area connected to Bosaso, Puntland’s main commercial centre. Its affiliation with the Islamic State gave it an international dimension, even as it remained far smaller than al-Shabaab.
None of this necessarily indicates public support. Armed groups often persist through intimidation and the absence of effective state authority. For nearby communities, accommodation may be a matter of survival rather than agreement.
The group occasionally operated beyond the mountains. In October 2016, its fighters briefly captured the coastal town of Qandala before Puntland forces retook it. In February 2017, it claimed responsibility for an attack on a hotel in Bosaso. In January 2023, a US military operation killed Bilal al-Sudani. Nevertheless, ISIS maintained a presence in hard-to-reach areas where its fighters could retreat and preserve their networks.
The conflict entered a new phase on 31 December 2024, when ISIS launched a major assault on a Puntland military position near Dharjaale. Puntland forces repelled the attack, but it demonstrated the group’s continued ability to organise coordinated operations.
Puntland intensified Operation Hilaac in early 2025, seeking to dislodge ISIS from the Cal Miskaad mountains and disrupt its networks.
The campaign combined ground offensives, intelligence gathering, restrictions on militant movement and external assistance. According to a February 2025 report, Puntland authorities said their forces had captured at least 50 locations described as ISIS bases and regained Balidhidhin, a former militant stronghold.
Assessing these advances, however, requires more than counting captured positions. Reports do not always distinguish between areas entered by troops, locations abandoned by militants and territory placed under continuous government control.
This distinction matters. Destroying a camp denies militants a base, but preventing their return requires surveillance, secure supply routes and forces capable of maintaining a permanent presence. The extent to which the campaign has reduced ISIS revenue also remains difficult to establish.
Puntland forces led the ground offensive, but external assistance also contributed to the campaign. On 1 February 2025, Washington announced airstrikes against ISIS targets in the Golis mountains.
Air power can reach positions that are difficult for ground troops to access, but holding territory ultimately depends on forces on the ground.
The United Arab Emirates has also maintained security ties with Puntland and has been identified in analyses of the campaign as an important partner, although its contribution to individual stages of Operation Hilaac is less clearly established.
Neither local knowledge nor external military capabilities can substitute for the permanent security and administrative presence required once militants are driven out.
Operation Hilaac appears to have substantially reduced ISIS-Somalia’s ability to operate openly from several established positions, but the organisation has not been eliminated.
A United Nations report from 2026 was cited as estimating that between 150 and 250 fighters remained in the Cal Miskaad mountains, although such figures are difficult to verify. The group’s strength also lies in its ability to raise funds, recruit replacements and maintain clandestine networks.
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An analysis published by the Critical Threats Project on 28 May 2026 described ISIS-Somalia’s efforts to rebuild. It noted that a decline in counter-ISIS operations toward the end of 2025 and early 2026 created opportunities for the group to re-establish a presence in areas from which it had previously been driven.
The analysis also reported renewed attacks in March 2026, including one in Bosaso, followed by intensified Puntland military operations.
These developments do not necessarily mean ISIS has regained its former strength or bases. However, they illustrate the risks of allowing military pressure to decline before a lasting security presence is established.
Armed groups that lose territory can disperse into smaller cells and exploit areas that security forces cannot continuously hold. Whether ISIS-Somalia can rebuild will depend largely on its ability to restore the financial, logistical and recruitment networks disrupted by the offensive.
Recovered territory also raises questions about communities that lived under ISIS intimidation or were displaced by the conflict.
The February 2025 report described some residents returning to Balidhidhin, suggesting improved local security, though not necessarily that the consequences of years of conflict had been overcome.
For rural communities, security means being able to move safely, sustain livelihoods and reach markets. Restoring normal life requires more than soldiers. Residents need water, healthcare, education, functioning local administration and mechanisms for resolving disputes without fear of intimidation.
In mountainous areas, local knowledge can help identify suspicious movements, but community cooperation depends on trust, civilian protection and confidence that government institutions will remain after military operations end.
Security forces operating in remote areas also need reliable salaries, transport, medical support and dependable supply lines. Without functioning institutions and a sustained presence, recovered territory remains vulnerable to infiltration.
Operation Hilaac demonstrates how a regional administration can organise a significant counterterrorism offensive through its own forces, knowledge of the terrain and external partnerships.
Yet the ability to launch an offensive does not automatically guarantee the institutional capacity to secure its results. This distinction is particularly important within Somalia’s federal system.
Armed groups frequently exploit gaps between jurisdictions and weaknesses in intelligence sharing. Cooperation among Puntland, the Federal Government and international partners therefore remains essential for monitoring militant movements, tracking financial networks and preventing fighters from relocating.
Such cooperation requires practical arrangements that continue functioning even when political relations between Puntland and Mogadishu are strained.
The campaign also calls for a broader measure of success. Beyond militants killed or bases destroyed, the central questions are whether attacks decline, whether extortion becomes less common and whether residents can travel, trade and access essential services without relying entirely on military protection.
Operation Hilaac has weakened ISIS-Somalia’s position in areas where it maintained a foothold for years. However, renewed militant activity reported in 2026 demonstrates that these gains cannot be regarded as irreversible.
The decisive test will be whether Puntland can hold the territory it has recovered, prevent ISIS from rebuilding its networks and restore effective security and civilian administration.
If successful, the campaign could demonstrate how military gains against an armed group can translate into lasting improvements in security, governance and community confidence.
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About the Author:
**Ali Mohamed Ali is a writer and analyst focusing on regional peace, security and counterterrorism, with particular emphasis on Somalia.
**The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Dawan Africa.