Opinion: Somalia and the Challenge of Building a Unified National Army

“Unifying the Somali army does not begin by gathering weapons inside military camps, but by agreeing on the state for which the soldier bears arms and the national leadership that gives him orders.”Abdirahman Mohamed Gure

When the Somali National Army was established in 1960, with the founding of the new republic, it was not merely another military institution added to the structures of the fledgling state. Rather, it was one of the most important symbols of national unity in a country emerging from two different colonial experiences.

From its first day, it was expected to bring together people from the north and south within a single institution and to protect the borders of a vast country possessing one of the longest coastlines in Africa.

Within a few years, the Somali army became one of the strongest armies in Africa. It fought its first war with Ethiopia in 1964, followed by the Ogaden War in 1977, which represented the peak of its military strength before its conclusion marked the beginning of tragedy.

The army made significant advances at the start of the war, before the balance of power shifted with substantial Soviet and Cuban support for Ethiopia, ultimately ending with the withdrawal of Somali forces.

An Army With Unified Institutions and Command#

It was an army in the full sense of the word. Its military doctrine was Eastern, influenced by Soviet training and weaponry, and its organisational structure extended from platoon to company, battalion, brigade and division.

It had formations known to Somalis by their numbers and areas of deployment, including the 26th Division in Hargeisa, the 21st Division in Dhusamareb and the 60th Division in Baidoa, in addition to two military bases equivalent in size to divisions in Kismayo and Bulo Burde.

The army was not merely a ground force. Somalia had an air force, a navy, air defence capabilities, and training and qualification institutions. The Ministry of Defence included specialised military bodies and departments responsible for the core functions of managing the institution, foremost among them the Operations Directorate, the backbone of military activity, alongside bodies and departments responsible for training, organisation, reconnaissance, intelligence, armament, logistics and supplies.

Each had its own role in planning, preparing forces, gathering intelligence and securing the needs of military units.

There was one command, one chain of command and one military doctrine. A soldier knew where his unit began and ended, who his commander was, and who had the authority to issue orders.

From the Army of the State to the Weapons of Armed Groups#

Today, this picture seems as though it came from another country.

The 1977 war did not bring down the army, but it opened cracks within both the military and the state that widened over the years. The country emerged burdened by losses, Somalia’s international alliances shifted, and armed opposition fronts against the revolutionary government began appearing one after another.

As the confrontation expanded, clan entered politics and politics entered the army. The institution that was supposed to protect the state itself began to suffer from the illnesses of the state.

Then came 1991. It was not only the government that collapsed; the army collapsed with it. Divisions and brigades disintegrated, military bases disappeared, weapons moved from state arsenals into the hands of armed factions, and many officers and soldiers returned to their regions and clans.

In a short period, Somalia went from being a country with a large army to a country where clans possessed the weapons.

And this is where the more difficult story begins.

It is relatively easy to rearm a weak army, train its units and change its commanders. But what do you do when there is no army left in the first place, and in its ruins emerge local forces, clan militias, armed movements and regional administrations, each with its own men, weapons, leadership and calculations?

Who Do These Soldiers Answer To?#

This is the dilemma Somalia has faced since the restoration of the state.

Successive governments and their international partners have spent considerable time and money rebuilding the armed forces. Training camps have opened, many batches of soldiers have graduated, well-trained units have emerged, and Somali soldiers have gained extensive experience in the long war against Al-Shabaab.

But the question has remained bigger than the number of soldiers and goes beyond the type of weapons: Who do these soldiers answer to?

The Federal Government says the army is the army of the state, while some federal member states believe that forces stationed on their territories should not operate far beyond their will.

Between these two positions, the disagreement is no longer only about the constitution, elections and resource-sharing. It has reached the most dangerous question a state can face: Who possesses the weapons, and who has the authority to order their use?

Puntland alone provides an example. There have been reports about the return of around 700 members of the Danab forces to the regional forces. But the issue goes beyond Puntland and the number of soldiers to the very meaning of an army.

In normal states, the deployment of the army within the country’s borders is not a political event. A national army does not belong to a federal member state, nor does it represent a region or clan.

Rather, it operates within the framework of constitutional legitimacy as a national force whose mission is to protect the state, its sovereignty and territorial integrity, while operating under one command and one chain of command.

For this reason, the movement of its units from one place to another should not raise questions about their identity or affiliation. The army does not visit its own country, nor is it a guest in one part of it. It moves across the territory of one homeland, defending it in the name of the state and under its flag.

But this equation has yet to take root in Somalia.

Federalism Does Not Mean Dividing the Army#

Here emerges one of the most difficult paradoxes of Somali federalism.

The old army was highly centralised, just as the state itself was highly centralised. But the remedy for centralisation is not to divide the army among federal member states or transform administrative boundaries into military borders.

Federalism can distribute administration, wealth and powers, but if it distributes the military institution, the army loses its national meaning. An army, by its nature, is a single force with a unified chain of command.

Somalia does not need to restore the army of 1960, nor replicate the experience of the 1970s. Times have changed, the state has changed and Somalia itself has changed.

But it does need to restore the idea upon which that army was built: the state must have one army.

The path towards that begins before the military camp and before the weapon, with a political agreement defining what the army is, what the forces of the federal member states are, what the role of the police is, who issues orders, and who has the authority to decide deployments.

Ambiguity on these issues may be politically useful for a time, but it becomes disastrous when it enters the barracks.

The Army Is Not the Police or the Security Services#

Another obstacle Somalia inherited from the military state is the confusion between the concept of the armed forces and other uniformed services.