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“Somalia’s long-term security will depend less on the presence of African Union troops than on whether Somalis can build institutions strong enough to replace them.” Abdikani Abdullahi Hajir
For almost two decades, African Union troops have stood between Somalia’s fragile government and the Al-Shabaab insurgency. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was deployed in 2007, restructured into the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in 2022, and succeeded by the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) in January 2025.
Although the mission’s name has changed, the central question remains: what happens to Somalia when these forces leave?
This article argues that a rapid or poorly planned withdrawal would weaken security, destabilize politics and worsen the humanitarian situation, while a gradual, adequately funded transition could enable Somalia to assume full responsibility for its own security.
The withdrawal debate is no longer theoretical. In July 2026, the United States informed the African Union that it would not support the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) beyond the end of 2026.
UNSOS provides the mission with essential supplies, including food, water, fuel, medical services and transportation. Losing this support could have severely disrupted operations even without a formal troop withdrawal.
Washington argued that Somalia had not developed sufficient capacity to sustain security gains or assume responsibility for its own security functions.
During the same period, Uganda, one of the largest troop contributors, announced plans to withdraw its forces after nearly twenty years of deployment.
On November 16, 2026, the United States reportedly reversed its position and agreed to support UNSOS for another year. However, the mandates of both missions are still due to expire on December 31, 2026, while significant funding challenges remain.
AUSSOM requires approximately $190 million annually, yet only a fraction of that amount has reportedly been pledged. The risk of a sudden operational collapse may have been postponed, but it has not disappeared.
The most immediate consequence of withdrawing African Union forces would be the creation of a security vacuum.
AUSSOM has approximately 12,000 military and police personnel who help protect Mogadishu, key supply routes and towns recovered from Al-Shabaab.
The Somali National Army is not yet fully capable of independently securing all these areas. It continues to depend on African Union support for logistics, medical evacuation and joint military operations, while facing challenges involving salary payments, command structures and clan loyalties.
Al-Shabaab has demonstrated its ability to exploit such weaknesses.
The military offensive launched in 2022 under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, supported by clan militias and international airpower, recaptured significant areas of central Somalia. However, some of those gains were subsequently reversed, and the militant group continues to control substantial territory across southern and central Somalia.
If African Union troops withdrew prematurely, Al-Shabaab could attempt to regain control of rural districts, threaten major supply routes and district capitals, and intensify complex attacks against Mogadishu.
The group’s operational history suggests that it would seek to exploit any security vacuum quickly.
The consequences would also extend beyond Somalia. Al-Shabaab has demonstrated its regional reach through attacks in northern Kenya, meaning that deteriorating security in Somalia could also threaten Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti.
There is another concern. Troop-contributing countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya maintain their own bilateral security interests in Somalia.
If the multinational African Union framework disappears, these countries may pursue separate security arrangements to protect their borders. Meanwhile, competing interests involving Ethiopia and Egypt in the Horn of Africa could increase the risk of Somalia becoming an arena for regional proxy competition rather than a partner in collective security.
The political consequences of withdrawal could be as serious as the military implications.
Somalia’s federal system remains incomplete, while relations between the federal government and member states, particularly Jubaland and Puntland, continue to face tensions. Disagreements over the electoral model have also deepened divisions between the government and opposition groups.
African Union forces have provided a stabilizing presence by helping protect state institutions and reducing the risk of armed confrontation in Mogadishu.
Without that presence, political actors could face greater pressure or temptation to resolve disputes through force.
The events of 2021 offer a warning. Disagreements over the electoral timetable triggered armed clashes in Mogadishu, exposing divisions within the security forces along clan lines.
Withdrawal could also alter the balance of political influence.
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Al-Shabaab has long portrayed African Union troops as an occupying force. Their departure could provide the group with a propaganda victory and strengthen its attempts to claim political legitimacy.
At the local level, deteriorating security could push some clans to negotiate with the militants or seek protection from them, potentially reversing the community-led resistance that helped government forces during the 2022 offensive.
Somalia already faces severe humanitarian challenges, including drought, displacement and declining international assistance.
Humanitarian funding has reportedly fallen from approximately $2.2 billion in 2022 to around $300 million in 2026, while numerous health and nutrition facilities have closed because of funding shortages.
Aid agencies depend heavily on secure roads, airstrips and transportation corridors, many of which have benefited from African Union security operations.
Renewed fighting could restrict humanitarian access, force more families into displacement camps around Mogadishu and Baidoa, and worsen food insecurity among communities already affected by Al-Shabaab’s taxation and territorial control.
The economic consequences could also be significant.
Businesses, ports and Mogadishu’s fragile economic recovery depend on a reasonable degree of security and stability.
Investors and diaspora returnees are particularly sensitive to deteriorating security conditions. A renewed escalation could discourage investment, interrupt commercial activities and undermine confidence in Somalia’s economic prospects.
A balanced assessment must also recognize the arguments advanced by supporters of African Union troop withdrawal.
The African Union mission has remained in Somalia far longer than initially anticipated. Critics argue that an indefinite African Union military presence can create dependency and delay necessary reforms within Somali security institutions.
Troop-contributing countries have also experienced prolonged delays in reimbursements, while some governments increasingly question the financial and political sustainability of maintaining their forces in Somalia.
Others point out that Al-Shabaab has survived nearly two decades of African Union military pressure, demonstrating that military operations alone cannot eliminate the insurgency.
These concerns are legitimate and help explain why many observers support transferring security responsibilities to Somali institutions.
However, the critical issue is not simply whether African Union troops should leave, but when and under what conditions.
A transition that takes place before Somali forces are adequately prepared could undermine the very security gains that African Union assistance was intended to protect.
The withdrawal of AMISOM and its successor missions would not necessarily end Somalia’s conflict. Instead, it could fundamentally alter the balance of power on the battlefield.
A sudden departure would risk strengthening Al-Shabaab, deepening political divisions and worsening the humanitarian crisis. Conversely, a gradual, conditions-based transition could strengthen Somalia’s sovereignty and reward its efforts to develop independent security capabilities.
Three priorities are essential to achieving that transition.
First, the Somali government must establish a unified, adequately paid and professional national army operating under a clear command structure, reducing dependence on clan-based militias.
Second, international donors and the African Union must establish a predictable, sustainable funding framework so that the mission does not remain dependent on annual emergency financial decisions.
Third, Somali political leaders must reach meaningful agreements on elections and federal relations. A divided political system cannot provide the unity of purpose required to address persistent security threats.
Ultimately, Somalia’s future cannot depend indefinitely on African Union troops. Their continued support remains important, but it must serve a clear transition toward effective Somali ownership of national security.
Somalia’s long-term security will depend less on the continued presence of African Union forces than on whether Somalis can build institutions capable of replacing them.
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Abdikani Abdullahi Hajir (Speaker) is a Senior Business Development Specialist and Human Resource Management expert.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Dawan Africa.