Questions of constitutional legitimacy, electoral governance, and the rule of law are increasingly shaping Somalia’s political future amid deepening divisions over the country’s democratic path
The hour-and-a-half interview conducted by Dawan TV with Somali Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) Salah Ahmed Jama failed to critically examine Somalia’s most urgent constitutional and political crisis: the absence of legitimate national leadership following the expiration of the mandates of both the Federal Parliament and the President on April 14 and May 15, 2026. The interviewers understood the terms of Somalia’s governing constitutional order, yet they did not press for clear or truthful answers.
Watch the full interview from here:
Deputy Prime Minister Salah has long been presented as the Federal Government’s most visible public voice on democracy and engagement with Western partners. He frequently invokes democratic principles, constitutional governance, and accountability. Yet throughout this interview, those principles appeared more as political messaging than as standards genuinely reflected in the conduct and accountability of the government he represents.
The interviewers appeared either unprepared or overly accommodating. They did not seriously challenge the Deputy Prime Minister’s superficial, evasive, and at times sarcastic answers. He repeatedly referred to his years of involvement in Somalia’s internationally supported state-building process since 2013, yet offered little substance or convincing explanation for the constitutional and political failures that have kept Somalia trapped in chronic fragility. Much of what he said remained vague and disconnected from the realities facing ordinary Somalis.
One pressing issue left entirely unaddressed was the escalating attacks, arrests, intimidation, and harassment of journalists. The case of Sa’dia Bajaj has drawn international attention. Ignoring that issue was both inexcusable and deeply concerning.
One of the Deputy Prime Minister’s most striking political statements came when he implied that Somalia is effectively divided into three political territories: Somaliland, Puntland, and South-Central Somalia. He argued that the political elite in South-Central Somalia, where the Federal Government is headquartered, had failed to develop a coherent strategy toward Somaliland, which he described as having built stronger democratic governance than the rest of the country. That was a politically significant criticism of the Federal Government and warranted serious follow-up. Instead, it passed without scrutiny.
The interview covered major political issues, including elections, the Constitution, Somaliland, and foreign policy. Yet the questioning lacked depth. The interviewers did not challenge him on violations of the Provisional Federal Constitution, findings by the Financial Governance Committee, repeated corruption concerns raised in public reports, failures in national security, abuse of power, human rights violations, unlawful sales of public land, forced evictions of internally displaced families, weak institutional capacity, or the widening gap between official government claims and realities on the ground.
Security was one major example. The government continues presenting the decline in Al-Shabaab suicide bombings and assassinations in Mogadishu as proof of major progress. Yet Al-Shabaab continues to control key areas, attack strategic targets in the capital, and remains capable of threatening even the President himself. Territory previously announced as liberated has been retaken, further demoralizing federal forces and the public at large.
That shift has strengthened Al-Shabaab and weakened public confidence in the Federal Government’s broader security capacity and long-term strategy. Residents of Mogadishu continue living under movement restrictions, checkpoints, and constant fear. Even constitutional rights such as peaceful assembly remain constrained by insecurity.
Debt relief was another missed opportunity. The interviewers could have asked why the Federal Government failed to fully implement key debt-relief benchmarks involving public financial management, customs unification, fiscal and taxation integration, Central Bank reform, macroeconomic governance, and national census preparation.
On the constitutional crisis itself, the interview missed perhaps its most important opportunity. When asked about the legal basis for the one-year extension claimed by President Hassan and Parliament, the Deputy Prime Minister referred only to statements made by President Hassan himself. He offered no constitutional justification and did not clearly acknowledge the well-known position of international partners. Nothing in either the Provisional Constitution or the disputed amendments supports a retroactive, self-granted extension of constitutional mandates.
Despite his academic credentials and years of service as adviser, Minister of Constitutional Affairs, and now Deputy Prime Minister, many of his answers contradicted the constitutional principles and democratic standards he has publicly claimed to defend.
At another point, he argued that the opposition must present an alternative election model while dismissing indirect elections as inherently corrupt. Yet the Federal Government itself has repeatedly relied on indirect elections, including in northeastern states, the federal parliamentary seat election in Baidoa, and elsewhere.
He also argued that President Hassan’s earlier public statements during the disputed constitutional amendment process carried no legal or political significance. That was a deeply troubling and undemocratic position. The interviewers did not challenge him on that claim.
His central argument throughout the interview was that the Federal Government had introduced one-person, one-vote elections while the opposition had failed to present an alternative.
Both arguments fail politically and practically.
Since 2024, Somalia’s international partners have repeatedly urged the Federal Government to pursue a consensus-based electoral framework. Their position has consistently made clear that unilateral one-person, one-vote cannot proceed without broad national agreement and credible legitimacy.
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Instead of building consensus, the government ignored those repeated recommendations and warnings, then used the disputed constitutional amendments as political leverage.
Today, international partners are strongly and publicly demanding what they demanded in 2024, when President Hassan introduced a presidential system and a federal electoral commission through disputed constitutional amendments. Yet after signing the so-called amended constitution, he selectively reopened negotiations around both issues. That selective approach directly conflicts with the foundational principles of Somalia’s parliamentary federal order.
In practice, the government’s so-called one-person, one-vote model remains an indirect election structured around the 4.5 formula.
The key difference is that President Hassan now controls the process from beginning to end through the federal electoral commission. Roles previously exercised by clan constituencies, traditional elders, and Federal Member States have effectively been centralized in the presidency.
The process is funded, directed, and politically managed from Villa Somalia through secret sources, while the Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP) is positioned to secure majority control across South-Central Somalia.
Puntland and Somaliland remain outside the framework, while Jubbaland continues under sustained political and security pressure. This deepens national fragmentation.
Repeating “one person, one vote” does not make the process one person, one vote. President Hassan’s insistence on the slogan increasingly resembles building a wall in the middle of the road, blocking all traffic, then forcing drivers either to crash into it or remain stranded under his control—instead of removing the obstacle.
There is no genuine one-person, one-vote election currently available for negotiation.
By defending the disputed constitutional amendments and the government’s electoral claims, the Deputy Prime Minister weakened his own academic and political credibility and undermined confidence in his stated commitment to a national democratic system of governance in a federated Somalia.
Given his qualifications, he understands the constitutional breaches involved in the unilateral amendment process. He knows the legal requirements that were bypassed. He also knows the flaws in the disputed election processes conducted in Mogadishu and in thirteen districts of Southwest State, along with the serious objections raised against those outcomes.
Most concerning was his admission that the Federal Government—now operating as a caretaker authority—is selectively implementing parts of the disputed amended constitution according to political convenience. That admission matters because applying constitutional provisions selectively based on political interest confirms the lawlessness of the incumbent Federal Government.
A constitution enters into force as one binding legal document—not as a menu from which politicians may choose what to enforce and what to ignore.
The self-granted one-year extension is a grave constitutional violation. It undermines public confidence in the rule of law and pushes Somalia deeper toward a dangerous political reality in which power is retained not through constitutional legitimacy but through unilateral control and force.
The Somali people must act early to prevent the normalization of authoritarian rule before it takes root again.
Even a one-day extension without constitutional legitimacy is illegal, unacceptable, and dangerous for Somalia’s constitutional future.
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Dr. Mohamud Uluso former Minister and Governor of the Central Bank of Somalia. Currently, he is an economic and political analyst and advocate for good governance and sustainable peace in Somalia.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Dawan Africa platform.