By Dawan Africa - -
“This article is a summary of an analysis by Maureen Farrell and Rose Lopez Keravuori published by the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and the GeoStrategy Initiative of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.
Summarized by Dawan Africa
In an analysis published by the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and the GeoStrategy Initiative of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Maureen Farrell and Rose Lopez Keravuori argue that Somalia should no longer be viewed solely as a counterterrorism challenge but as an emerging strategic asset with growing economic and geopolitical importance.
For more than three decades, successive US administrations have largely viewed Somalia through the lens of counterterrorism. This perspective was shaped by the enduring threat posed by al-Shabaab, one of al-Qaeda’s most capable affiliates, as well as the growing role of Islamic State-Somalia (ISIS-S) within transnational jihadist networks. American perceptions have also been influenced by the legacy of the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, during which eighteen US service members were killed.
However, according to the authors, Somalia should no longer be regarded solely as a security challenge. They argue that the country possesses significant geostrategic and economic potential that remains largely overlooked by Washington.
Somalia occupies a critical position near the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the gateway between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. As instability continues to affect maritime traffic in the wider region, including disruptions linked to conflicts around the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, Somalia’s strategic importance is likely to increase.
Farrell and Keravuori contend that Somalia may represent one of Africa’s most underappreciated medium- and long-term investment opportunities. They argue that carefully targeted US security investments could help create the stability necessary for both counterterrorism gains and broader economic development.
The authors stress that this does not require abandoning efforts against terrorist organizations. Rather, it involves recognizing that a more secure Somalia could generate substantial strategic and commercial benefits for the United States.
They note that Washington already possesses a significant presence in Somalia, even if this engagement is often overlooked.
The analysis points to Turkey as an example of a country that has steadily expanded its influence through military training programs, investments in ports and airports, maritime cooperation, and, more recently, offshore energy exploration. Turkey’s deep-sea drilling initiatives off Somalia’s coast demonstrate an approach that combines security cooperation, diplomacy, and commercial interests.
While the authors do not advocate replicating Turkey’s model, they argue that the United States should recognize that security investments can also generate political and economic opportunities.
According to Farrell and Keravuori, US involvement in Somalia has already extended beyond military operations. They cite civilian assistance programs, intelligence-sharing arrangements, coordinated drone operations, anti-piracy efforts, and military training initiatives as examples of a multilayered American engagement strategy.
A central component of this effort has been the Danab Brigade, the US-trained elite unit of the Somali National Army, which the authors describe as a cornerstone of American security assistance.
Nevertheless, they argue that US policy still lacks a coherent framework linking security cooperation to broader political and economic objectives.
The authors maintain that the key question facing Washington is no longer whether it should remain engaged in Somalia, but rather what long-term objectives that engagement should serve.
They acknowledge that sustained counterterrorism operations remain essential. Both al-Shabaab and ISIS-S continue to demonstrate resilience, adaptability, and regional influence, making them enduring threats to stability.
However, Farrell and Keravuori contend that tactical military successes alone are insufficient. Without clearly defined political and economic goals, the United States risks failing to translate battlefield gains into lasting strategic outcomes.
They propose that Washington should increasingly evaluate its activities in Somalia through broader criteria, including the protection of maritime trade corridors, the strengthening of local governance and accountability, the promotion of resilience, and the creation of conditions favorable to investment.
This approach is particularly important given Somalia’s proximity to maritime chokepoints that facilitate between 12 and 15 percent of global trade and approximately 30 percent of global container traffic.
The authors argue that attacks and disruptions linked to Iran-backed Houthi activity have elevated the importance of securing Red Sea shipping lanes. As a result, security cooperation with Somalia should be viewed not only through a counterterrorism lens but also as part of a broader Red Sea security strategy.
They suggest that recent US moves, including the lifting of sanctions on Eritrea, indicate a growing recognition in Washington that the Horn of Africa’s coastal states should be viewed collectively as part of a single maritime theater.
Farrell and Keravuori also highlight Somalia’s considerable untapped economic potential.
They point to underexplored offshore oil and gas resources, fisheries, mineral deposits, logistics corridors, ports, and future tourism opportunities. They also note that northern Somalia, including Somaliland, may possess promising mineral resources, although further geological studies are needed.
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According to the authors, Somaliland authorities have already pursued international partnerships in the energy and mining sectors and have expressed interest in opportunities linked to emerging battery-mineral supply chains.
At the same time, the authors caution against excessive optimism. Somalia remains politically fragmented and continues to face security challenges, constitutional disputes, and electoral tensions that complicate the investment environment.
Nevertheless, they argue that frontier markets often become more attractive when security efforts focus on protecting specific geographic areas, infrastructure assets, and economic corridors.
The analysis recommends a more selective approach to US security assistance.
Rather than attempting to reform the entire Somali security sector, the authors argue that American resources should be concentrated in areas where three conditions overlap: significant terrorist threats, cooperative local partners, and meaningful economic potential.
They identify Jubaland in southern Somalia, Puntland in the northeast, and Somaliland in the northwest as regions where those conditions converge.
In practical terms, they advocate continuing targeted operations against al-Shabaab and ISIS-S while expanding maritime domain awareness initiatives, coastal surveillance programs, port security cooperation, and potentially creating additional specialized forces modeled on the Danab Brigade in areas where US interests are most directly engaged.
The authors devote particular attention to Somaliland, describing its status as a sensitive and complex issue.
They note that countries such as Israel and the United Arab Emirates have shown increasing interest in Somaliland due to its relative stability and strategic location near the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.
At the same time, they acknowledge that neighboring countries and the African Union have traditionally supported Somalia’s territorial integrity, fearing that recognition of Somaliland could encourage separatist movements elsewhere on the continent.
Without taking a position on Somaliland’s final status, Farrell and Keravuori argue that the United States can still expand commercial engagement, maritime cooperation, technical exchanges, and private-sector dialogue with Somaliland while maintaining support for regional stability.
Beyond security cooperation, the authors emphasize the importance of diplomacy.
They argue that Somalia should not become an arena for competing regional and international rivalries. Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Iran all possess interests in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region.
While some of these actors contribute investment and security assistance, others risk exporting geopolitical rivalries that could further destabilize Somalia.
The authors suggest that Washington should welcome burden-sharing by partners such as Turkey while simultaneously discouraging the use of Somali ports, Federal Member States, security institutions, or political disputes as instruments of proxy competition.
Farrell and Keravuori conclude that counterterrorism will remain an essential component of US policy toward Somalia. Terrorist threats are unlikely to disappear, and security cooperation will continue to be necessary.
However, they argue that defining Somalia solely through the prism of terrorism risks causing Washington to overlook significant strategic and economic opportunities.
In their view, the United States should adopt a broader strategy that combines security, diplomacy, maritime protection, economic engagement, and regional stability. Such an approach would not only help contain terrorist threats but also secure vital trade routes, reduce proxy competition, and position the United States to benefit from opportunities that other international actors have already begun to recognize.
This article is a summary of an analysis by Maureen Farrell and Rose Lopez Keravuori published by the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and the GeoStrategy Initiative of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.
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