By Dawan Africa - -
“The decisive battle begins after recognition: whether Somaliland can turn diplomatic legitimacy into lasting economic, institutional and international integration.”- Nassir Hussein Kahin
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An article published in The Times of Israel argues that Israeli recognition of Somaliland would represent a major diplomatic breakthrough for Hargeisa, but recognition alone would not overcome the political, legal and economic advantages Somalia derives from its internationally recognized sovereignty.
Written by Hargeisa-based political analyst Nassir Hussein Kahin, the article examines how Mogadishu can use international regulatory systems to contain the practical impact of recognition and prevent other countries from following Israel.
Recognition Is Only the Beginning
Somaliland has developed many institutions normally associated with a functioning state, including its own government, security forces, judiciary, currency and administration. Somalia, however, retains internationally recognized sovereignty over the territory.
Kahin describes this as an imbalance between Somaliland’s control on the ground and Somalia’s stronger legal position internationally.
“Recognition can open a diplomatic door, but whether that door leads to wider international acceptance depends on what happens afterward,” Kahin writes.
He argues that Somalia does not need to defeat Somaliland militarily to obstruct its international integration. Instead, Mogadishu can use what he calls “administrative lawfare,” relying on recognized authority over international systems involving aviation, finance, shipping and diplomacy.
Turning Recognition Into an Administrative Problem
According to Kahin, international companies usually operate according to recognized regulatory frameworks. When Mogadishu and Hargeisa issue competing instructions, airlines, banks, insurers and shipping companies are likely to consider which authority presents the lower legal and commercial risk.
“Somalia is actively turning International Recognition into an Administrative Problem,” Kahin argues.
He describes this dynamic as “corporate compliance arbitrage,” through which Somalia can reinforce its sovereignty claim through decisions made by private companies.
Recognition consequently becomes more than a question of diplomacy. Its practical value depends on whether airlines can operate, banks can process payments, ships can access ports and investors can obtain predictable financing.
Airspace as a Sovereignty Lever
Aviation provides one of the clearest examples. Somalia regained internationally recognized control of the Mogadishu Flight Information Region at higher flight levels in 2023, strengthening its regulatory position over airspace covering the former Somali Republic, including Somaliland.
Kahin points to disputes over flight clearances following the Ethiopia-Somaliland memorandum of understanding and competing aviation procedures between Mogadishu and Hargeisa.
“The broader Somalia strategy is therefore straightforward: make international aviation to Somaliland dependent on Somalia’s recognized regulatory position,” he writes.
Such authority can complicate diplomatic visits and international travel to Hargeisa, demonstrating how internationally recognized sovereignty can produce practical leverage even without physical control.
Banking and International Finance
Somalia enjoys a similar advantage in international finance. Its internationally recognized central bank and regulatory institutions occupy the formal sovereign position, while Somaliland-based financial institutions face greater obstacles when establishing international relationships.
Anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist-financing requirements make international banks particularly sensitive to regulatory uncertainty.
“Diplomatic recognition without financial connectivity can remain largely symbolic,” Kahin writes.
The same imbalance exists in relations with the World Bank, IMF and other international financial institutions, which generally operate through recognized sovereign governments. Somaliland can attract private investment and develop infrastructure, but it does not enjoy normal sovereign access to major multilateral financial mechanisms.
Berbera and Maritime Regulation
The maritime sector is another critical arena because Berbera is one of Somaliland’s most important economic assets.
Somalia has sought to reinforce its international maritime position through regulatory measures and participation in international maritime frameworks. Kahin cites cargo-tracking requirements as an example of how federal authority can extend into commercial operations.
“The consequence is an economic paradox: Somaliland can secure the port operationally while still paying an international price for its unresolved legal status,” he writes.
International insurers also operate through recognized risk classifications and institutional procedures. Somaliland may provide maritime security around Berbera, but its ability to influence international insurance assessments remains limited without recognized sovereign status.
Somalia’s Diplomatic Firewall
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Mogadishu’s strongest instrument may ultimately be diplomatic. Somalia bases its case on sovereignty, territorial integrity and respect for inherited borders — principles strongly embedded in the African and international systems.
The Ethiopia-Somaliland memorandum demonstrated how Somalia can mobilize regional and international partners against initiatives it considers violations of its sovereignty.
“The objective is to prevent a chain reaction or a domino effect of recognitions,” Kahin writes.
If Israel recognizes Somaliland but other governments do not follow, Somalia could portray the decision as an isolated exception rather than the beginning of a new international consensus. For Hargeisa, therefore, securing a second recognition could become as consequential as obtaining the first.
Territorial Disputes Complicate Recognition
Somalia can also use internal territorial disputes to challenge Somaliland’s diplomatic case. The SSC-Khatumo administration, particularly in Las Anod and parts of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn, allows Mogadishu to argue that Hargeisa does not exercise uncontested authority across all territory it claims.
“The issue therefore becomes not simply ‘Should Somaliland be recognized?’ but also ‘Which territory would recognition encompass?’” Kahin writes.
This matters because Somaliland’s statehood argument is closely connected to the borders of the former British Somaliland protectorate. Disputes within those boundaries can therefore make recognition more politically and legally complicated for governments considering such a move.
What Israel Could Do After Recognition
Kahin argues that Somaliland’s response cannot depend exclusively on diplomatic declarations. Israeli cooperation could instead concentrate on civilian technology, trade, finance, maritime safety and human-capital development.
“If Somalia’s strategy operates through institutional and economic systems, Somaliland’s response cannot rely exclusively on political declarations,” he writes.
Commercial relationships could play an important role. Kahin proposes stronger chamber-of-commerce ties and cooperation in agriculture, water technology and industrial equipment, creating economic relationships capable of surviving political disagreements.
Water, Agriculture and Energy
Water and agriculture could provide particularly visible areas of cooperation. Israeli expertise in precision agriculture, drip irrigation, desalination and water recycling could support Somaliland’s agricultural and livestock sectors.
“A successful water project, agricultural technology program or livestock-support initiative does not require the international community to resolve the sovereignty dispute before people see its value,” Kahin argues.
Energy cooperation could similarly focus on solar power, microgrids and efficiency, particularly around the Berbera Economic Zone. Reliable energy would support logistics, manufacturing, telecommunications and water infrastructure while linking recognition to measurable economic benefits.
Financial Compliance and Berbera
Financial modernization may be even more important than major investment announcements. Kahin argues that Somaliland should demonstrate compatibility with international financial standards rather than seek to circumvent them.
“The purpose should not be to create parallel systems designed to evade international regulation. Quite the opposite,” he writes.
Israeli technical assistance could strengthen compliance, risk screening, transaction security and due diligence, giving foreign banks greater confidence to engage with Somaliland.
Berbera could meanwhile become a demonstration of international commercial standards through cooperation in navigation safety, search and rescue, coast-guard professionalism and counter-smuggling capabilities.
Education and Human Capital
Kahin also advocates university partnerships, academic exchanges and technology incubators involving software, engineering, data management, medical technology, veterinary services and vocational education.
“Recognition cannot be sustained by diplomatic offices alone,” he writes.
Such programs could create long-term connections among students, researchers, entrepreneurs and professionals while strengthening Somaliland’s capacity to participate in international economic networks.
From Recognition to International Integration
The article ultimately portrays the Somalia-Somaliland dispute as a contest increasingly fought through institutions rather than battlefields. Aviation rules, banking compliance, maritime documentation, insurance classifications, multilateral financing and diplomatic norms can all determine the practical meaning of sovereignty.
“The decisive question is what comes after recognition,” Kahin concludes.
Israeli recognition would therefore represent only the starting point. If it remained an isolated diplomatic event, Somalia could attempt to contain its impact and prevent other countries from following. But if recognition were accompanied by commercial, technological, financial, maritime and educational integration, Somaliland could seek to turn one diplomatic breakthrough into a more durable international position.
For Kahin, the ultimate challenge is whether Somaliland can transform recognition from a political symbol into functioning international relationships — and whether Somalia can use its recognized sovereign status to prevent that transformation.