Opinion:Somaliland’s Miscalculation: When Grievance Becomes Strategy

““One cannot invoke victimhood under authoritarian violence as justification for separation while simultaneously using force to deny others the same right of choice. ”Musharaf Abdullahi Rashid

Whenever I meet someone from Somaliland, there is one question I consistently ask out of genuine intellectual curiosity: Can you demonstrate, through reasonable and consistent arguments, a right to independence and separation from Somalia?

The answer almost always begins with 1988, when an authoritarian regime committed atrocities against civilians in northern Somalia. That history is real, tragic, and undeniable. But the question that follows is unavoidable: Does suffering under an authoritarian system, by itself, constitute a sufficient and universal justification for secession from an existing state? Or is this standard being selectively applied?

If that principle were accepted, Somaliland would not be unique. Many regions across Somalia were specifically targeted by the same regime. By that logic, they too would possess equal moral and political grounds for separation. The reasoning weakens further when examined against Somaliland’s own actions. In northeastern Somalia, armed force has been used against communities that rejected secession and sought to remain part of a united Somalia. Cities have been shelled, civilians killed, and consent overridden by coercion.

Even within northwestern Somalia, the Awdal region has long been home to opposition to the secessionist project, with communities expressing a desire to remain within Somalia. The irony is striking: Awdal’s grievances also stem from the authoritarian system whose violence Somaliland’s leadership invokes to justify separation. If victimhood under Siad Barre justifies secession for one community, it must logically justify the same for others, including those within Somaliland’s claimed borders.

This reveals a fundamental moral inconsistency. One cannot invoke victimhood under authoritarian violence as justification for separation while simultaneously using force to deny others the same right of choice. If coercion invalidates unity, it also invalidates secession. Practices condemned in the past do not become legitimate simply because the actors have changed.

The broader claim that any group suffering under a state should pursue secession is not only flawed but historically unsustainable. Applied universally, it would threaten the territorial integrity of many modern nation-states. Syria, Rwanda, Ethiopia, and even the United States have experienced conflicts that raised profound questions about national unity. The American Civil War alone resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths after a secessionist movement rooted in the defence of slavery became an armed struggle. The outcome preserved the Union rather than recognising the Confederacy’s claim to independence.

When this argument loses force, it often shifts. The claim becomes that southern Somalia has endured decades of terrorism and governance failure and therefore will never achieve stability, making separation a rational necessity. This argument also fails under scrutiny.

Northern Somalia had an extraordinary opportunity after 1991. Hargeisa could have positioned itself as the political centre of a rebuilding Somalia, hosting national reconciliation and leading a fractured country from a position of relative stability. The potential inflow of international funding, infrastructure investment, human capital, and political authority could have been transformative. Instead, more than three decades have been spent insisting on non-belonging. Meanwhile, Mogadishu, despite decades of insecurity, has developed into a larger economic, infrastructural, and demographic centre.

Stability alone does not generate prosperity. Strategic political choices matter. The relative stability of Hargeisa could have benefited its people far more had it been leveraged within a national framework rather than channelled into a secessionist project that, after more than three decades, has struggled to secure broad international recognition or lasting security.

Consider an alternative path: Hargeisa hosting the 2000 Arta Conference and the 2002–2004 Mbagathi peace process, becoming a centre of Somali state reconstruction and competing for national leadership. Compare the potential outcomes of that strategy with the present reality, in which the region finds itself increasingly exposed to regional conflicts and political entanglements beyond its capacity to manage.

The international system has made one reality increasingly clear: Muslim-majority states are often treated through a distinct political lens in global power calculations. In this context, unity — political, economic, and strategic — is not a romantic ideal but a necessity for survival. Against this backdrop, the attempt by a political entity shaped by clan-based interests to exit the Somali framework and align itself with Somalia’s historic regional adversary, Ethiopia, and with Israel represents not pragmatism but strategic recklessness.