By Omar Abubakar Mohamed - Somali writer and journalist specialising in Somali political affairs and the geopolitical dynamics of the Horn of Africa.
“The dispute over Somaliland is no longer merely a domestic issue; it has become part of a broader regional and international struggle where strategic interests and influence increasingly intersect.”- Omar Abubakar Mohamed
Israel’s decision on 26 December 2025 to recognise the Somaliland administration marked a turning point in one of the Horn of Africa’s longest-running political disputes. As the first country to extend formal recognition since Somaliland’s unilateral declaration of independence nearly thirty-five years ago, Israel fundamentally altered the political context surrounding the issue.
The significance of the move lies not only in the recognition itself but also in the identity of the state that granted it. Israel’s decision appears to have been driven primarily by geopolitical and security considerations. Rather than an end in itself, recognition became a means of expanding Israeli influence in the Horn of Africa—a region that has emerged as an increasingly important arena of competition among regional and global powers.
By recognising Somaliland, Israel shifted the dispute beyond its traditional domestic and regional dimensions into the realm of international strategic rivalry. The question of Somaliland can no longer be viewed solely through Somalia’s internal political dynamics but must also be understood within the broader context of geopolitical competition in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.
Somalia’s Diplomatic Response#
The decision prompted an immediate diplomatic response from Somalia’s Federal Government. Mogadishu launched an intensive campaign to mobilise regional and international opposition while urging influential capitals and international organisations to reaffirm Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Somalia characterised Israel’s decision as a violation of international law and the principles governing respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. Emergency diplomatic consultations and regional meetings sought to reinforce international support for Somalia’s legal position.
Although these efforts did not prevent Israel from establishing relations with Somaliland and exchanging official delegations, they achieved an important objective: preventing recognition from spreading to other countries.
Eight months after Israel’s announcement, no other state had followed its example. This suggests that Somali diplomacy succeeded, at least in part, in containing the international repercussions of the decision and preventing it from evolving into a broader wave of recognition.
Israel’s move was unlikely to have been an isolated initiative. Rather, it appeared consistent with broader regional understandings involving actors that had already cultivated relations with Somaliland. Reports suggested that some partners intended to encourage friendly governments to adopt similar positions before eventually extending recognition themselves. Mogadishu’s sustained diplomatic campaign disrupted that trajectory by raising the legal and political costs associated with recognition.
Beyond Diplomacy#
Somalia’s response was not limited to diplomacy. The Federal Government also sought to influence political opinion within Somaliland by highlighting the potential political and security costs of closer ties with Israel.
This domestic dimension became visible as opposition voices within Somaliland criticised efforts by President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Irro” to deepen relations with Israel, particularly proposals concerning the establishment of a diplomatic presence in Jerusalem.
At the same time, Mogadishu expanded its presence in the newly established North East State. Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre’s inauguration of a new Somali National Army command represented not only a security development but also a political signal that the Federal Government intended to strengthen its influence domestically while continuing its diplomatic campaign abroad.
Somalia’s strategy increasingly rests on two parallel tracks: preventing the consolidation of Israel’s presence through sustained diplomatic engagement while simultaneously encouraging domestic debate inside Somaliland over the long-term implications of closer ties with Israel.
Regional and International Reactions#
Somalia received support from several regional and international organisations, including the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the League of Arab States, as well as numerous member states. While these actors publicly defended Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, their positions were also shaped by broader geopolitical interests in the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden.
At the same time, the positions of some neighbouring states remained ambiguous. Although the African Union rejected Israel’s recognition, collective positions do not always reflect the policies of every member state, whose national interests may diverge from regional consensus.
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The crisis became a test of Somalia’s diplomatic partnerships. It revealed which countries translated longstanding relationships into concrete political support and which adopted a more cautious approach when confronted with a strategically sensitive issue.
More broadly, the episode demonstrated that state behaviour in disputes of this nature is shaped not only by legal principles but also by security interests, strategic calculations and shifting regional balances of power. Somalia therefore needs a foreign policy that is better equipped to navigate these evolving realities.
The Future of the Dispute#
The dispute over Somaliland predates Israel’s recognition by decades. Somaliland continues to justify its claim to independence by pointing to its relative stability, multiparty political system and peaceful transfers of power, while Somalia’s Federal Government continues to face significant state-building and security challenges.
A negotiated settlement remains unlikely in the near future because support for independence is no longer confined to political elites. Generations raised under Somaliland’s de facto institutions increasingly identify with the existing political order, strengthening the social foundations of the secessionist project.
In this context, Israel’s presence and Somaliland’s independence ambitions have become increasingly interconnected. As long as Somaliland continues to pursue international recognition, Israel is likely to maintain an interest in preserving its foothold there.
Two complementary courses of action offer the most realistic path forward. The first is to sustain diplomatic pressure while strengthening domestic political engagement that highlights the political costs of closer ties with Israel.
The second is to open direct negotiations between the Federal Government and the Somaliland administration within an agreed political framework capable of addressing the constitutional and political issues at the heart of the dispute, while preserving Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Political dialogue should not be seen as a concession on Somalia’s legal position. Rather, it remains the most effective means of resolving a protracted conflict before new political realities become irreversible.
Conclusion#
Israel’s recognition has reshaped both the Somaliland dispute and the wider geopolitical environment surrounding Somalia. The challenge facing Mogadishu now extends far beyond responding to a single diplomatic decision. It must adapt its political and diplomatic strategy to an increasingly complex regional order.
Success will ultimately depend on combining effective diplomacy, stronger domestic cohesion and meaningful political dialogue that addresses the underlying causes of the dispute while safeguarding Somalia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and long-term national interests.
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Omar Abubakar Mohamed is a Somali writer and journalist specialising in Somali political affairs and the geopolitical dynamics of the Horn of Africa.
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The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Dawan Africa.