By Hussein Shegow Mohamed - Writer focusing on Somali politics, security and humanitarian affairs. He holds a master’s degree in international relations and diplomacy.
“Clan divisions did not start South West Somalia’s crisis; they became the means through which a political dispute escalated into armed confrontation.” Hussein Shegow Mohamed
Introduction#
Anyone who follows Somali politics will recognise a familiar pattern. When political leaders disagree over elections, mandates or government positions, the debate often shifts within weeks from institutions and political authority to clan loyalties.
This has been particularly evident in South West State in 2026. This article examines how the crisis developed, the consequences of the conflict and why its outcome matters beyond Baidoa.
Understanding South West State#
The Land and Its People#
South West State comprises the regions of Lower Shabelle, Bakool and Bay. Baidoa serves as its administrative capital. The state is known for agriculture and livestock production.
The Digil and Mirifle communities, collectively known as Rahanweyn, constitute the majority of its population. Their extensive network of sub-clans is among the most complex in Somalia.
How It Began#
South West State was first established in April 2002 by the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA), following a meeting in Baidoa involving the RRA central committee and approximately 70 elders from the Digil and Mirifle communities.
The state later became part of Somalia’s federal system in 2014, following the formation of its current administration.
Instability From the Beginning#
Political stability has never been easy to achieve in South West State.
During its early years, forces loyal to RRA chairman Hassan Mohamed Nur Shatigadud clashed with those supporting his deputies in Baidoa. More than seven people were killed, and a vaccination training programme was suspended.
The pattern was familiar: disagreements among political leaders led to armed confrontations, while ordinary public services suffered the consequences.
How the Crisis Developed#
Years of Friction With Mogadishu#
The political rupture in 2026 did not emerge unexpectedly.
According to one account of the tensions, South West authorities opposed the proposed deployment of Egyptian troops, preferring the Ethiopian forces already operating in the region.
The same account suggests that supplies to the army’s 60th Division in Baidoa, which supported President Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen, were cut off after the unit allegedly disobeyed orders from the federal defence minister, a political rival of the South West leadership.
Federal plans to organise elections in Barawe added to the growing tensions.
Constitutional Reforms#
The constitutional amendments became a major point of contention.
The federal government introduced changes to the electoral system, including provisions for a transition towards broader public participation in presidential elections.
The opposition Somali Future Council rejected the amendments and argued that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s mandate would expire on 14 April.
The reforms also extended the presidential term from four to five years, further intensifying disagreements over political authority and constitutional legitimacy.
Two Former Allies Fall Out#
The dispute also had a personal political dimension.
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Laftagareen had previously maintained a close political relationship. Their differences became increasingly visible as Laftagareen shifted his position on the constitutional changes.
In mid-March, Laftagareen withdrew from the ruling Justice and Solidarity Party.
What began as a disagreement between two political allies developed into a broader confrontation between the federal government and South West State.
From Political Dispute to Armed Conflict#
The March Confrontation#
On 28 March, Laftagareen was re-elected by the South West State assembly.
Two days later, violent clashes erupted on the outskirts of Baidoa after the federal government declared the election invalid.
Federal forces subsequently took control of the city, bringing Laftagareen’s presidency to an end.
Accounts of his departure differ. Some describe his resignation, while others maintain that he was removed following the military intervention.
These conflicting accounts illustrate the contested narratives surrounding the crisis.
Renewed Fighting From May to September#
The establishment of a new leadership did not restore stability.
As the state prepared to swear in members of parliament selected in the 10 May election, fighters loyal to Laftagareen clashed with forces in Baidoa.
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Heavy fighting resumed on 17 August, while attacks disrupted communications across the Baidoa area.
On 3 September, the federal Defence Ministry announced that its forces had repelled an early-morning assault by militias affiliated with Laftagareen and Al-Shabaab.
However, a former South West State spokesperson described the attackers as forces loyal to Laftagareen.
The competing accounts demonstrate how even the identity and responsibility of the armed groups involved remain politically contested.
Narrowing the Space for Dialogue#
The South West administration has designated Laftagareen and his associates as members of a terrorist organisation.
Such a designation makes political engagement considerably more difficult. Once an opposing group is formally labelled in this way, negotiations become politically costly, reducing the space for a peaceful settlement.
Where the Tensions Lie#
Two Competing Camps#
The conflict has produced two principal political camps.
On one side stands the federal government and its new political allies in South West State. On the other are Laftagareen and the armed groups supporting him.
Both sides maintain forces on the ground and claim political legitimacy.
The central disagreement is no longer simply about an election or an individual leader. It concerns who has the authority to govern South West State and how that authority should be exercised.
Why Clan Loyalties Become Central#
Political disagreements become particularly dangerous when state institutions appear to favour one sub-clan over another.
When the army, police or government ministries are perceived as serving particular clan interests, communities may begin to view political opponents as threats to their collective security rather than merely as rivals in government.
Elders, young people and entire neighbourhoods can then become involved in a confrontation in which they initially had little interest.
Clan divisions did not create the original political dispute. Rather, they became the means through which that dispute expanded and escalated.
This distinction matters because treating the crisis solely as a clan conflict risks overlooking the political decisions and institutional weaknesses that helped produce it.
What Could Help Resolve the Crisis?#
A Genuine Political Agreement#
A sustainable settlement requires agreed rules governing elections, terms of office and the distribution of political power.
Any negotiations should involve mediators acceptable to the principal parties, allowing both sides to participate without feeling that the outcome has already been determined.
Security Forces That Serve Everyone#
Security institutions must operate under a clear chain of command and recruit personnel on the basis of merit rather than political or clan affiliation.
Soldiers and police officers should be regarded as representatives of public institutions, not as forces belonging to individual leaders or communities.
Reconciliation From the Community Level#
Traditional elders, women and young people can play an important role in rebuilding trust.
In many communities, these groups enjoy greater local credibility than political officials. Their participation in reconciliation efforts could help address grievances that national-level negotiations may overlook.
Protecting Civilians#
The immediate protection of civilians must remain a priority.
This includes ensuring safe access for humanitarian assistance, protecting displaced families and preventing further disruption to essential services.
Political negotiations cannot succeed if communities continue to bear the consequences of armed confrontation.
Conclusion#
The South West State’s crisis did not begin as a clan conflict. It emerged from disagreements over constitutional rules, political mandates and the exercise of authority.
As those disagreements intensified, clan loyalties became a means of mobilisation, turning a political confrontation into a wider security crisis.
The experience demonstrates the dangers of allowing disputes over political legitimacy to be settled through armed force rather than functioning institutions.
Ultimately, rebuilding confidence in governance, security institutions and political dialogue will do more for South West State’s future than any military victory on the battlefield in Baidoa.
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About the Author
Hussein Shegow Mohamed is a writer focusing on Somali politics, security and humanitarian affairs. He holds a master’s degree in international relations and diplomacy.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Dawan Africa.