By Summarised by - DAWAN Media
The Red Sea is undergoing a rapidly changing security environment that could make the African shore the source of a new regional crisis, as internal conflicts in the Horn of Africa intersect with competition among Middle Eastern powers and growing risks facing one of the world’s most important maritime corridors.
This is the main conclusion of a report published by the European Council on Foreign Relations on July 28, 2026, titled “Shoring Up the Red Sea: Why the Next Crisis May Begin in the Horn of Africa,” by researcher Corrado Čok.
The report argues that the international focus on Houthi attacks does not reflect the full picture, as conflicts in Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia are becoming increasingly intertwined with the calculations of external powers.
These developments are becoming more significant as the strategic importance of the Red Sea grows. After the war between the United States and Iran exposed the vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz, attention returned to alternative routes for energy exports.
According to the report, Saudi Arabia exported between three and four million barrels of oil per day through the Red Sea during April and May, nearly double the amount that passed through Bab el-Mandeb in 2024. Pipeline projects designed to bypass Hormuz could further increase the importance of this corridor in the future.
The report notes that the danger no longer comes from Yemen alone. On the African side, the war in Sudan intersects with tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, while conflicts in northern Somalia are becoming entangled with Saudi-Emirati and Turkish-Israeli competition.
At the same time, Somali piracy has made a notable comeback, with the report saying Somali pirates hijacked three vessels in the Gulf of Aden during April and May, including two oil tankers.
Another factor adding to these risks is the spread of low-cost drones, which are giving states and armed groups an increasing ability to threaten maritime corridors. The report points to the Islamic State in Somalia carrying out its first recorded drone attack in Puntland in January, while reports have indicated that Al-Shabaab has used drones for reconnaissance and propaganda purposes.
Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea: Conflicts Converge#
The report devotes considerable attention to the growing overlap between the war in Sudan and Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions. It argues that the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces is no longer an isolated internal war, but is increasingly intersecting with competition between Addis Ababa and Asmara, raising the possibility of a wider confrontation along the Red Sea.
According to the report, Ethiopia continues to seek access to the sea, while it points to Addis Ababa’s interest in Eritrea’s Assab port. Eritrea, meanwhile, has strengthened its relations with Tigrayan leaders and Ethiopian opposition groups, while the effects of this rivalry are becoming visible inside Sudan.
The report cites reports of increasing coordination between Tigrayan forces, the Sudanese army and Eritrea in the east, alongside allegations of Ethiopian assistance to the Rapid Support Forces in Blue Nile State.
The author argues that any direct escalation between Ethiopia and Eritrea could draw in the parties to Sudan’s war and external powers, particularly Egypt, which maintains close relations with the Sudanese army and Eritrea amid its continuing dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
The report places these tensions within a broader map of regional alignments, considering Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia closer to the Sudanese army and Eritrea, while the UAE, and to a lesser extent Israel, have ties with Ethiopia and the Rapid Support Forces, while noting that some of these links have been officially denied.
The author warns that external support could encourage local actors to overestimate their capabilities, thereby increasing the likelihood of a regional confrontation threatening Red Sea security.
Somalia: A Potential Second Front#
The report considers Somalia the second main potential front in a Red Sea crisis. According to its analysis, the problem is that Somalia’s internal disputes are no longer separate from regional competition, but are becoming increasingly intertwined with the interests of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Israel.
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The report links this shift to Israel’s recognition of the breakaway region of Somaliland in December 2025 and the security relationship that subsequently developed between the two sides, alongside the UAE presence in Berbera.
In response, it says Mogadishu severed its security ties with the UAE and moved to strengthen its defence relations with Saudi Arabia and Qatar while expanding its longstanding partnership with Turkey.
The report also points to Abu Dhabi’s continued support for Puntland and Jubaland amid their dispute with the federal government, linking these divisions to the broader political struggle over elections and federal leadership. According to its analysis, these disputes could become more dangerous when they intersect with regional conflicts and external interests.
Northern Somalia at the Centre of the Competition#
The report pays particular attention to northern Somalia, which it sees as the area most susceptible to becoming a new flashpoint because of disputes over Sool, Sanaag and Cayn and competition among the federal government, Puntland and the breakaway region of Somaliland.
The report notes that the conflict changed significantly following the 2023 fighting, when local clan forces defeated Somaliland forces, before Mogadishu later supported the establishment of the North East State of Somalia in territories claimed by both Hargeisa and Puntland.
It considers Sanaag one of the most important arenas of competition because of its strategic location on the Gulf of Aden, alongside local divisions, drought and conflict over resources.
The author argues that external powers are increasingly finding opportunities to intervene through these divisions. He cites reports of Turkish plans to establish a presence in Lasqoray, with Turkish vessels and UAE-linked aircraft reportedly spotted in the area.
The report summarises the situation by saying that northern Somalia is becoming an arena where local and national divisions intersect with competition between Saudi Arabia and the UAE on one side, and Israel and Turkey on the other.
The risks are not limited to political and military confrontations. According to the report, any major escalation in northern Somalia would directly threaten the Gulf of Aden and could create additional space for piracy networks, the Islamic State and Al-Shabaab.
The author also points to reports that the two groups received weapons smuggled by the Houthis across the sea during the previous year.
Europe Faces a New Test#
The report concludes by warning Europe against treating the Horn of Africa merely as an arena for humanitarian and development assistance. According to the author, instability there is now directly linked to maritime security and the European economy, particularly if the Red Sea experiences another disruption following the Strait of Hormuz crisis.
The author proposes expanding European deployments and missions in the region, where the European Union already operates the Aspides and Atalanta naval missions. He also calls for greater European engagement with the Somali government, Puntland and Somaliland, using security and development tools to help de-escalate tensions and resolve disputes.
He further calls for the EU’s 2026 funding packages, including €75 million for the African Union mission and €63 million in humanitarian assistance, to be used in ways that support stabilisation objectives, alongside closer European coordination with the United States and Britain regarding Somalia’s political crisis and Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions.
The report’s central message is that Red Sea security can no longer be separated from stability in the Horn of Africa. Conflicts that once appeared separate are beginning to converge, while the interests of Middle Eastern powers are becoming increasingly intertwined with them, raising the risk that a local crisis could rapidly escalate to the regional level and threaten Bab el-Mandeb, the Gulf of Aden and international trade.
The author concludes that Europeans still have an opportunity to act before these crises merge into a wider confrontation, warning that waiting until they become another maritime emergency could make them more difficult and costly to contain.